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1. Introduction 
 
The literature review at hand is the first deliverable of Work Package no. 7 The global 
financial crisis in the public sector as an emerging coordination challenge of the EU 
Seventh Framework program project Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector 
of the Future (COCOPS). The main purpose of the review is to give an overview of 
the cutback management literature and its findings of cutback strategies in the public 
sector in the 1970-80s. The aim is to look at the application and impact of various 
cutback management and decision-making practices and discuss whether lessons 
could be learnt for the current crisis. 
 
The recent global financial and economic crisis, followed by fiscal crisis, have lifted 
the topic of cutback management back on the research agenda, as many governments 
in Europe and elsewhere either plan or have already implemented austerity measures 
in order to cope with the concurrent problems of lower revenues and high public debt. 
It can be expected that the large-scale cutbacks, undertaken by numerous 
governments, would lead to changes in public administration practices. Thus, the 
impacts of the global crisis and the subsequent retrenchment on public administration 
and governance is and will continue to be a challenging issue for several years to 
come (Pollitt 2010; Thynne 2011; Coen and Roberts 2012). Looking at the patterns of 
cutback management during the previous era(s) of austerity can therefore provide 
useful insights for coping with the current crisis. 
 
In light of the large-scale impacts that a fiscal crisis can have on government and 
society, it is somewhat surprising how little systematic analysis one can find in the 
scholarly literature of public administration on the topic of cutback management. As 
Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 1) put it: “a great deal of academic thought has been 
given to explaining the problem of government growth, but there has been no 
comparable attention to explaining how the difficulties of cutting back government 
might best be approached …” Rosenthal (2003, p. 130) argues that one of the reasons 
for that might be that crises appear to be unfit for comprehensive causal explanation, 
predictability and possibilities for intervention. Still, despite the relative lack of 
systematic research on the topic, there is by now a sufficient body of studies dealing 
with the topic of cutback management, which can provide input for a more 
comprehensive review and also offer insights about the various strategies of cutback 
management and the effects of cutbacks on public management practices.  
 
Public administration literature on cutback management falls into three categories – 
studies of public administration on cutback management of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
contemporary public administration literature on managing austerity (related to the 
recent economic crisis), and generic management research on organizational decline 
(Bozeman 2010; Cepiku and Savignon 2012). As the current review focuses on crisis-
led cutbacks, we focus on the first two streams; only some insights are drawn from the 
organization decline literature where appropriate. The review concentrates mainly on 
the public administration cutback management literature of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
and the contemporary public administration literature on retrenchment serves as a 
complementary source. Since the body of current research dealing with cutbacks and 
retrenchment is still evolving and growing, we do not (yet) aim to provide a 
comprehensive and systematic review of the contemporary literature. To compile the 
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review, both theoretical and empirical studies addressing either the central or local 
government level, or different policy fields, were made use of. The review is not 
restricted to any particular country or group of countries
1
. 
 
The cutback management literature in public administration began with the seminal 
article by Levine (1978), followed by a surge of publications dealing with the topic. 
The early works on cutback management differed in their foci by looking at: 
leadership tactics for managing decline (Behn 1980a; Biller 1980), budgeting 
(Glassberg 1978; Behn 1985; Lewis 1988) and termination of programs (Behn 1978; 
Brewer 1978; deLeon 1982) (see Bozeman 2010). The public administration 
scholarship on cutbacks “reached its zenith in the early 1980s” but then vanished 
(Bozeman 2010, p. 558) to rise again with the recession of the early 2000s. This time 
a surge of literature on cutback budgeting (see, e.g., Ward 2001; Maher and Deller 
2007; Packard et al. 2007) took place, followed by a major spurt of cutback 
management research in the post-2008 fiscal environment. The contemporary public 
administration literature on managing austerity is diverse, being especially rich in 
studies labeled “preliminary” and “paving the way for more elaborate theorizing” 
(e.g. Lodge and Hood 2012; Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011; Pollitt 2010).
2
 The 
current stream of public administration cutback literature shows a more long-term 
concern by looking at the relationship between cuts and reforms and the necessity of 
principles for managing the new responsibilities of governments (see Thynne 2011; 
Dabrowski 2009; Gieve and Provost 2012). Also the issue of citizens’ (declined) trust, 
(heightened) expectations and general attitudes towards government, and the role of 
public leadership have been addressed (Massey 2011; Posner and Blöndal 2012; 
Kattel and Raudla 2012; Van de Walle and Jilke 2012). All in all, the existing 
academic studies show that up to now the government responses to the crisis have 
been diverse; there have been “as many responses as countries” (Peters 2011, p. 76), 
and in many cases the responses have been contradictory (see Bideleux 2011; Lodge 
and Hood 2012; Kickert 2012; Peters 2011; Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011; 
Pollitt 2010; Verick and Islam 2010). 
 
Most of the empirical studies on cutback management (especially in the earlier 
stream) have been written about the US (especially about the US local governments) 
and the UK (focus on the retrenchment politics in Whitehall during the 1970s and the 
Thatcherism). Substantially fewer, but an increasing number of studies address the 
Western European countries (e.g., Kickert 2012; Mattila and Uusikylä 1997; Stern 
and Sundelius 1997) or (new) EU member states (e.g., Bideleux 2011; Dabrowski 
                                                     
1
 To collect the literature, the ISI Web of Knowledge and Google scholar search engines were used 
with keywords “crisis and public administration”, “cutback management”, “cutback budgeting”, “fiscal 
stress management” and “fiscal crisis”. We focused on public sector cutbacks brought about by fiscal 
crisis or other external pressures (e.g. the pressure from external creditors like was the case in Britain in 
the 1970s). We focused primarily on the academic literature in the scholarly field of public 
administration. When making the selection of the article to be included in the review, we left out 
studies from the literatures of political economy and welfare state retrenchment for two reasons. First, 
including studies from these streams of literature would have made the scope of the literature review 
too broad and second, many studies in these literature do not deal with issues directly connected with 
mitigating a fiscal crisis.  
2
 This is most probably the result of the rather short time frame not suitable for comprehensive policy 
analysis, as the impact of the crisis on the patterns of governance is prolonged due to the complicated 
linkages between states, markets and civil societies (Pollitt 2010; Thynne 2011). 
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2009; Raudla 2012; Raudla and Kattel 2011). Appendix I provides a summary of the 
empirical studies that are covered in this overview. 
 
The literature review proceeds as follows. Firstly, the general cutback strategies are 
outlined and their main characteristics discussed. Thereafter the most prominent 
instruments for cutting back the government expenditure and the sectors most 
influenced by cutbacks are set forth as found in the academic literature. Subsequently 
the managerial issues are being dealt with by looking more specifically at the changes 
and shifts during cutback period in terms of centralization of power and decision-
making, budgeting procedures, human resource management, performance 
management and managing change. Throughout the paper theoretical conjectures and 
empirical findings are presented hand in hand. The review is concluded with a chapter 
discussing the main constraints of lesson-drawing from the previous crisis and 
cutback management.  
2. Cutback strategies: across the board versus targeted cuts  
 
When faced with fiscal stress necessitating the need to impose spending cuts, public 
organizations can essentially choose between two sets of actions: first, denying or 
delaying the cuts and, second, implementing actual cuts. Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 
145) claim that the actions are dependent on whether the key decision makers opt for 
“conviction politics” or “cosmetic politics”.3 Especially in the early phases of fiscal 
stress, organizations can be characterized by what Levine (1979, p. 181) calls the 
“Tooth Fairy Syndrome” epitomized by actors’ unwillingness to believe that the talk 
of cuts is real and that the decline is only temporary. The “Tooth Fairy Syndrome” 
can often be accompanied by “Fairy Gold” tactics, which entails postponing the cuts, 
for example, by “offering cuts in years two and three of the survey period – cuts that 
disappear in year three like the gold at the end of a rainbow” (Wilks 2010, p. 104). 
The hope of those using this tactic is that when the point of time arrives for cutting, 
the financial circumstances have changed and no cuts are necessary (Hood and Wright 
1981, p. 183). In this section we focus on the approaches that entail the making of 
“real cuts”. 
 
In the literature on cutback budgeting and cutback management (which started in the 
1970s), a number of categorizations of the cutback approaches have been put forth. 
The most basic distinction is between across-the-board and targeted cuts: across-the-
board measures refer to cuts in equal amounts or percentages for all institutions, while 
targeted cuts imply that some institutions and sectors face a larger cut than others. 
This dichotomy has been labeled in various ways. The across-the-board tactics has 
also been called “cheese-slicing” (e.g. Pollitt 2010), “decrementalism” (e.g., Levine, 
Rubin and Wolohojian 1981; Levine 1985; Bartle 1996), and “equal misery” approach 
(Hood and Wright 1981). The “targeted” or “selective” cuts approach has been 
conceived of as involving an array of possible tactics, ranging from “strategic 
prioritization” and “managerial” to “ad hoc” or even “random” (or garbage can) cuts 
                                                     
3
 In the first case “the only cut worth making is real” and retrenchment is seen as an end in itself. In the 
latter case cutbacks are achieved by creative accounting and statistical and judicious reclassification 
aiming to cut the numbers presented in important documents in the form of “paper cuts”. (Dunsire and 
Hood 1989) 
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(see, e.g., Levine 1978, 1979; Behn 1980a; Bartle 1996; Hendrick 1989). Strategic 
response to fiscal stress would entail decisions on the department’s mission and core 
services and corresponding prioritizations in resource allocations (Levine 1985, p. 
692). Simply put, such a response would mean that in making reductions to programs, 
low-priority programs would be cut more than high-priority programs (Levine and 
Rubin 1980, p. 15). Specifically, a strategic approach to cutbacks would entail “(1) a 
multiyear time frame, usually three to five years; (2) a significant reallocation and 
reconfiguration of re-sources; (3) substantial changes in organizational structure and 
work force activity; and (4) a comprehensive as opposed to an ad hoc re-examination 
of the organization’s problems, mission, and structure” (Levine 1985, p. 691). In the 
managerial approach, the cuts are also selective, but instead of using comprehensive 
and rational analysis for making the cuts, the officials use “programmatic criteria 
related to mandatory and nonmandatory expenditures to determine requests and 
appropriations” (Hendrick 1989, p. 30).  
More detailed categories of approaches have been elaborated by various authors. Jick 
and Murray (1982, p. 144), for example, distinguish between seven basic response 
strategies to cutbacks: rational priority planning, externally oriented political cuts, 
internally oriented political cuts (cuts on those units that have the least power to 
resist), across-the-board cuts, delay, abdication (turning to others to for decisions), 
passivity. Turem and Born (1983) differentiate between “traditional” and “new” 
retrenchment strategies in the area of human services. The “traditional” responses are: 
across-the-board cuts, hiring freeze, and lobbying for reductions in cutbacks; the 
“new” strategies are: improving management practices, setting priorities in client 
needs and services provided, using self-help and non-service approaches, building 
new relationships and creating alliances with other agencies and firms. Plant and 
White (1982) outline five strategies: across-the-board cuts, improving productivity, 
cutting marginal programs, outsourcing and other market-driven strategies, 
clarification and utilization of organizational mission. Dunsire and Hood (1989) 
distinguish between decrementalism, reorganization, demanning and curtailment. 
These more detailed categorizations, however, usually “mix” the cutback strategies 
themselves and changes in management practices that cutbacks may imply. For the 
purposes of clarity, in this literature review we deal with the overview of the general 
cutback strategies in the current section and with the changes in management 
practices in section 4.
4
 Also, it is worth noting that while some of the “general 
categories” put forth for conceptualizing cutback strategies are purely descriptive, 
some categorizations are already “quasi-explanatory” (i.e. implicitly putting forth 
conjectures between certain features of the cutback environment and cutback tactics). 
This is the case with categorizations put forth, e.g., by Bartle (1996), who 
distinguishes between incrementalism, a systematic administrative response model 
and a managerial response model.
5
 Since such categories either implicitly or explicitly 
                                                     
4
 Though some authors (e.g. Pollitt 2010) include “productivity improvements” (i.e. trying to do the 
same with less resources) among the general response strategies in cutback budgeting, we prefer to 
view it, again, as part of the “management implications” (dealt with in section 4), rather than as a 
general cutback-budgeting strategy. As the term “less resources” in the productivity improvement tactic 
says, cuts must have already been made “somewhere” among the expenditures. 
5
 Klase (2011) also distinguishes between the “systematic administrative response model” and the 
“fiscal pressure framework”.  
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deal with various factors influencing the choice of cutback tactics, these will be 
discussed in sections 2.2. and 2.3.  
 
2.1. Normative discussion: advantages and disadvantages of 
decrementalism versus targeted cuts 
 
In normative discussions about how to go ahead with the cutbacks, two lines of 
arguments can be found. Most call for more rational approaches (see, e.g., Levine 
1985: McTighe 1979; Turem and Born 1983; Austin 1984) implying the making of 
cutbacks on the basis of comprehensive analysis and strategic prioritization, while 
some – out of pragmatic considerations – argue that “rational” approaches may not 
necessarily be the most feasible option in the midst of a fiscal crisis and hence 
decremental approaches could be more advisable. Indeed, as Hood and Wright (1981, 
p. 203) put it, “The equal misery approach may have very strong element of 
rationality about it.” In the following we give a brief overview of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the “decremental” approach to making cutbacks. The mirror images 
of these arguments can be viewed as cons and pros of targeted cuts.  
The main advantages of decrementalism (entailing across-the-board cuts) are the 
following: 1) it reduces decision-making costs; 2) it minimizes conflict and 3) it is 
perceived as being equitable (Levine 1978, 1979; Hood and Wright 1981; Biller 1980; 
Schick 1983; Dunsire and Hood 1989; Wilks 2010). First, across-the-board cuts do 
not require extensive ex ante analysis for identifying the expenditure categories that 
will be cut (Levine 1978, p. 320; Hood and Wright 1981, p. 204). Thus, such cuts can 
be imposed quickly and relatively “easily” (Hood and Wright 1981; Schick 1988). 
Further, because of the nature of the public sector, comprehensive analysis for 
identifying the objects of cuts can be complicated. As Levine (1978, p. 320) notes, 
targeted cuts “involve costly triage analysis because the distribution of pain and 
inconvenience requires that the value of people and subunits to the organization have 
to be weighed in terms of their expected future contributions.” This is all the more 
difficult because “in government there is substantial complexity, uncertainty, and 
differences of opinion about means and ends that convert into disagreements about 
priorities” (Levine 1984, p. 252). Second, the decremental approach minimizes 
conflicts (both within the organization and between the organization and pressure 
groups) since it avoids “specifying the victims” (Hood and Wright 1981, p. 206), 
horse-trading and political agonizing (Wilks 2010, p. 103). As Schick (1988, p. 528) 
explains it, selective cuts based on strategic prioritizations assume systematic 
evaluation of the existing programs but “evaluations stir up conflict at the time that 
government officials desperately need support for the tough choices they face. Budget 
targets and ceilings mask the programmatic impacts of cuts; review and evaluation 
highlight these consequences.” Third, the “equal misery” entailed in decremental cuts 
makes them seem equitable and enables the “cutters” to appeal to “common sense 
ideals of justice” (Levine 1978, p. 320) and hence increase the perceived fairness and 
legitimacy of the cuts (Biller 1980). Further, “sharing the pain” implied by across-the-
board cuts may even “integrate” (Biller 1980, p. 607) and “help to maintain morale”, 
“build a good team spirit” (Levine 1979, p. 182) and unify the members of the 
organizations (Hood and Wright 1981, p. 206). 
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Despite its apparent advantages, the decremental approach has also been extensively 
criticized in the literature on cutback budgeting and cutback management. 
Specifically, the main drawbacks of across-the-board cuts are considered to be the 
following: 1) such cuts may not reflect the public needs and preferences; and 2) may 
penalize efficient organizations; further, they 3) may ignore varying needs of different 
units and 4) lead to a decline in service levels and quality. First, as Levine (1985, p. 
692) puts it, “decrementalism at the margins of units and programs does not reflect a 
realistic assessment of public needs and preferences for services.” In other words, 
across-the-board cuts would be a reasonable response only if “the present budget 
reflects perfectly the community’s desired mix of government services” (Lewis and 
Logalbo 1980, p. 186), which may not always be the case. Second, a serious 
shortcoming of across-the-board cuts is that they are likely to penalize more efficient 
organizations, units and individuals, because “they will be forced to make much 
tougher decisions about who, what, and how cuts will be distributed” (Levine 1979, p. 
181). Third, across-the-board cuts can be “insensitive to the needs, production 
functions, and contributions of different units”. Indeed, such cuts may have 
differential impacts on units with different sizes and different levels of specialization. 
As Levine (1978, p. 322) argues, across-the-board cuts may not be “felt” by large 
unspecialized units, but for small specialized units, across-the-board cuts may prove 
“immobilizing”. Finally, Levine (1985, pp. 692, 697) points out that the problems 
caused by incrementalism may accumulate and lead to declining service levels and 
service quality or even to “general service default”. Indeed, beyond a certain 
threshold, across-the-board cuts may lead to effects or unforeseen impacts on 
organizational performance. Behn (1980a, p. 615) argues that when “across-the-board 
cuts exceed a certain threshold (i.e. the point where organizational slack can be used 
to absorb the cuts without reducing output significantly), a budgetary cutback of Y 
percent will reduce production by more than Y percent.” More generally put, as 
Levine (1978, p. 317) argues, “organizations cannot be cut back by merely reversing 
the sequence of activity and resource allocation by which their parts were originally 
assembled. … Therefore, to attempt to disaggregate and cut back on one element of 
such an intricate and delicate political and organization arrangement may jeopardize 
the functioning and equilibrium of an entire organization.”  
In light of these drawbacks, Behn (1980a, p. 617) puts it rather strongly when he 
states, “During retrenchment, ad hoc decision making, which is responsive only to 
crises and pressures, not any overall plan, is dangerous.” Most other authors are 
somewhat more pragmatic and argue that decrementalism may be appropriate for 
dealing with small cuts, whereas achieving deeper cuts necessitates selective cutbacks 
(Levine 1984; Schick 1983, p. 21). As Schick (1983, p. 19) observes, small across-
the-board cuts usually allow organizations to continue “business as usual”. Levine 
(1984, p. 252) puts it in more specific terms, when he notes that decrementalism 
would be “probably appropriate when a downturn is in fact cyclical and cuts are not 
very deep (e.g., 7% or less of the budget in any one year or 15% over a three-year 
period).” Beyond this level, however, problems arise and the decremental approaches 
may take “a heavy toll in the effectiveness of organizations.”  
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2.2. Which approaches dominate in reality? 
 
According to the incrementalist theory of budgeting (see, e.g., Wildavsky 1964), the 
cutbacks would be decremental, essentially taking the form of “incrementalism” in 
reverse, with cuts amounting to “decrements” from the base (Dougherty and Klase 
2009; Bartle 1996; Klase 2011). Thus, the incrementalist framework would predict 
that among cutback strategies, the use of across-the-board cuts would prevail (Schick 
1983; Bartle 1996). The “managerial” approach argues that across-the-board cuts 
would be difficult because significant portions of the budget entail mandatory 
expenditures; thus the decision-makers would make cuts to those areas where 
expenditures are controllable (Downs and Rocke 1984; Bartle 1996; Pammer 1990). 
The “political behavior” framework predicts that cuts would be selective since 
decision-makers would want to minimize the public opposition to the cuts. More 
specific predictions have been made by authors who discuss the systematic links 
between environmental factors (like the severity and duration of fiscal stress) and 
cutback tactics chosen; these will be reviewed in section 2.3.  
With regard to the question regarding which of these two general cutback tactics – 
across-the-board or targeted approaches – dominate in reality, the existing empirical 
studies offer mixed evidence. Table 1 offers an overview of the empirical studies that 
have examined this question. The majority of the studies looking at the local 
governments in the US find only limited or no evidence of the prevalence of across-
the-board cuts (e.g., Bartle 1996; Downs and Rocke 1984; Lewis 1988; Pammer 
1990)6, although there are some studies that find at least some evidence of across-the-
board cuts at the local level (e.g., Levine 1985; Lewis 1984). There seems to be more 
evidence, however, for the governments utilizing the across-the-board option at the 
state level; even here, however, the studies usually find that the governments use a 
mix of across-the-board and targeted measures (see, e.g., Braun, Johnson and Ley 
1993; Dougherty and Klase 2009; Klase 2011).7 There are, however, relatively few 
studies examining the prevalence of these two cutback tactics at the national level. 
Still, Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 94) find in their study that the spending pattern 
during the cutbacks between 1975 and 1985 in the UK show little evidence of the 
early equal misery in Whitehall.8 
 
                                                     
6
 Dougherty and Klase (2009, p. 596) also conclude in their review of the US studies that “Most 
research on city responses to fiscal stress has generally not been supportive of the decremental 
viewpoint.” 
7
 For a more detailed discussion of the cutback budgeting literature in the US see, for example, 
Scorsone and Plerhoples (2010) and Klase (2011).  
88
 Furthermore, they state that “misery” was more widely shared in staffing than in spending (Dunsire 
and Hood 1989, p. 87), meaning that more departments cut staffing than spending. 
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Table 1: Prevalence of across-the-board vs targeted cutbacks: findings of 
empirical studies 
 Predominantly 
decremental/ across-
the-board cuts 
Predominantly targeted cuts Equal mix of across-the-
board and targeted cuts 
Local 
government 
Levine (1985) 
Lewis (1984) 
 
Bartle (1996) 
Downs and Rocke (1984) 
Levine, Rubin and 
Wolohojian (1981) 
Lewis (1988) 
Maher and Deller (2007) 
Packard et al. (2007) 
Hendrick (1989) 
Rickards (1984) 
 
Sub-national 
state-level 
government 
Braun, Johnson and 
Ley (1993) 
 Bowling and Burke (2006) 
Dougherty and Klase 
(2009) 
Klase (2011) 
NGA and NASBO (2010) 
National-level 
government 
Schick (1983) 
 
 Dunsire and Hood (1989) 
Hartley (1981)  
Kattel and Raudla (2012) 
Raudla and Kattel (2011) 
 
 
2.3. Factors influencing cutback strategies 
 
A number of studies in the cutback-management and budgeting literature also discuss 
the factors that are likely to influence the general cutback strategy (i.e. decremental vs 
targeted) chosen by the decision-makers.  
 
Two factors that have received extensive attention are: the duration and severity of 
fiscal (di)stress on the consolidation actions taken by decision-makers. It is 
conjectured that the longer-lasting and the more severe fiscal stress is, the more likely 
it is that the authorities start imposing targeted cuts (rather than implementing the 
across-the-board measures) (Levine 1979, 1985; Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 1981; 
Hood and Wright 1981). Levine (1979, p. 182) argues that at the beginning of the 
austerity, across-the-board cuts are more likely (as the “sharing the pain” option is 
likely to be perceived as more equitable and hence to generate less conflict and 
resistance), but if these measures are not sufficient, more targeted cuts on the basis of 
prioritization will be adopted (see also Hood and Wright 1981; Pollitt 2010). 
Similarly, in their “administrative response model” of cutback budgeting, Levine, 
Rubin and Wolohojian (1981) predict that governments would respond to fiscal stress 
in a systematic way, depending on the duration and severity of fiscal stress. They 
conjecture that in initial phases of revenue-decline, the cutbacks would be 
decremental, but the larger and longer-lasting the revenue declines are, the more 
likely the adoption of targeted cuts becomes (see also Klase 2011). 
 
Bartle (1996) distinguishes between two quasi-explanatory models when discussing 
the link between the cutback environment and cutback tactics chosen. In his version 
of the “administrative response model”, the cutback decisions of the authorities would 
depend on changes in resource levels, interest groups, and formal authority structure. 
The “unstructured, managerial response model” or “garbage can model”, however, 
would predict that there would be no systematic links between environmental 
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characteristics (like fiscal stress or interest groups that the authority faces) and 
cutbacks chosen; instead, there would be “a hodgepodge of fairly random responses 
across governments in response to revenue declines” (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  
 
The existing empirical studies (mostly dealing with sub-national governments in the 
US), point to mixed evidence with regard to the systematic relations between factors 
like the duration and severity of the fiscal stress and the specific cutback tactics 
chosen. Many studies (e.g., Wolman and Davis 1980; Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 
1981; Levine 1985; Glassberg 1978; Dougherty and Klase 2009; Hartley 1981; Rubin 
and Willoughby 2009; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010) do find evidence of the shift 
from across-the-board to targeted measures, as the fiscal stress deepens while other 
studies are more contradictory in their findings. Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 183) find 
proof of the sequential occurrence of incrementalist and manageralist measures, but 
conclude that the short time horizon between the two poses a question about the real 
influence of “the deepening crisis”. Several studies have found no evidence on the 
systematic impact of the length and severity of the fiscal stress on the cutback 
measures chosen (e.g. Bartle 1996; Downs and Rocke 1984; Pammer 1990). Instead, 
these studies provided more evidence for the “managerial” model, whereby the 
decision-makers cut those parts of the budget that are controllable. 
 
In addition to the “external” environmental factors that are likely to influence the 
choice between decremental or selective cutback strategies, there are also a number of 
organizational features that may influence this choice. Glassberg (1978), for example, 
argues that in organizations with more fixed tasks, decremental strategies are likely to 
dominate, whereas those with more flexible tasks would be able to opt for more 
targeted cuts. As he explains, the cutback strategy chosen in an organization would 
depend on the leadership style that emerges in the organization during fiscal stress. He 
conjectures that “cut the fat tough guy”-type leadership (focused on cutting overhead 
costs and constraining labor costs) is more likely to emerge in organizations with 
fixed functions, whereas “revitalizing entrepreneur”-type leadership (would seek to 
“redirect organization into a narrower scope of activity, hoping to create a new 
equilibrium between resources and costs”) is more likely to emerge in organizations 
with flexible functions.
9
 Levine (1985, p. 695) argues that the ability of the 
departments and agencies to undertake more strategic approaches depends on their 
strategic capacities, including, for example, financial forecasting, cost accounting and 
planning capacity. McTighe (1979, p. 89) argues that “rational” approaches to cutback 
budgeting and management would be hampered by the following factors: 
decentralization of an organization, an unclear mission, contentious politics and a 
strong clientele.  
                                                     
9
 His empirical study of cutback management in NYC confirms these conjectures. 
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3. Patterns of cutting expenditures  
 
The fundamental question of cutback management is how to cut public expenditure 
and what should be cut. These interrelated issues are touched upon in the following 
chapter. Section 3.1. looks at the different cutback instruments and discusses their 
corresponding advantages and disadvantages. Section 3.2. surveys the prevalence of 
cuts in different expenditure categories. Section 3.3. gives an overview of the sectors 
that traditionally suffer most during the cutbacks.  
 
3.1. Main cutback instruments  
 
The cutback management literature is rich in depicting different instruments for 
dealing with reduced public sector resources and cutting public expenditures. For a 
systematic overview we classify the different cutback instruments according to the 
following taxonomy: 1) instruments for cutting operational measures (running costs); 
2) program measures (transfers and grants) and 3) capital expenditures (investments). 
For each category numerous tools for freezing, squeezing, canceling, postponing, 
shortening, reducing and limiting different government activities and the spending of 
public resources exist, as brought out below.  
 
3.1.1. Cutting the operational expenditures 
Reductions in operational expenditures are commonly categorized by the object of 
expenditure, distinguishing between personnel expenditure and non-personnel 
expenditure (Wolman and Davis 1980, p. 232). 
 
The measures for cutting personnel costs can be geared at reducing the number of 
workers, working time or remuneration. Thus, the list of instruments entails a number 
of options, ranging from reducing overtime to dismissal. In the literature the most 
often cited instruments to cut personnel expenditure are the following: reduced 
(over)time; furloughs; wage freeze or reduction in the rate of salary increase; 
slowdown of promotion; salary cuts; filling positions with less credentialed, lower-
paid staff; reducing pay grades of vacated job lots; early retirement; reshuffling of 
staff; hiring freeze and layoffs (Downs and Rocke 1984; Levine 1978, 1985; Wolman 
and Davis 1980).  
 
In the academic literature the strengths and weaknesses of hiring freeze and layoffs 
have attracted most attention.  
 
Hiring freeze is seen as “a convenient short-run strategy to buy time and preserve 
options” that is neither an efficient nor an equitable cutback instrument in the longer 
run (Levine 1978, p. 321; Wright 1981). It is argued that this instrument hinders the 
management from making appropriate decisions on whom and where to cut and 
impedes intelligent long-term planning (Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980; Levine 
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1978, p. 322).
10
 Cayer (1986) cautions that attrition may punish professional 
managers who have already reduced waste in their organizations, compared to 
managers in other organizations which could be overstaffed. During an extensive 
hiring freeze an organization may fall short on some critically needed skills and at the 
same time be unable to hire people with necessary skills even if they are readily 
available. This happens because attrition most probably occurs at different rates in the 
various professional and technical specialties and resignations are most likely among 
employees with the best opportunities for employment elsewhere. (Ibid) Then again, 
Rubin (1980, p. 169) argues that the advantage of attrition lies in its peaceful and 
conflict-mitigating nature that “does not stir up too much antipathy between 
departments and too much resentment against administrators”. Dunsire and Hood 
(1989, p. 38) see the non-replacement of natural wastage as a “relatively painless” 
method, mainly because it avoids redundancies, dismissals, appeals and other 
attendant procedures.  
 
Laying off personnel is seen as a useful tool when the speed of reducing costs is 
important to the manager to satisfy either the political leadership or citizens by 
demonstrating a reduction of the costs of government (Cayer 1986). Greenhalgh and 
McKersie (1980, p. 582) warn that layoffs have costly side-effects: insecurity created 
by layoffs increases the number of voluntary quitting (especially of the most valuable 
employees), disrupted teamwork, poorer work morale and lower productivity; in sum, 
this could lead to a system that is costly to operate. Insecurity is often the result of the 
belief that layoffs can be manipulated by managers as ways of getting rid of 
unpopular employees (Dennis 1983). Levine (1978) argues that when layoffs are used 
for cutbacks, the state loses substantial investment in human capital (since recruiting 
and training replacement is costly). Yet, Hood and Wright (1981, p. 211) claim that 
dismissals cause the loss of youthful talent (vs “the old wood”), as in the first round 
low-paid, short-service and younger workers (who are the cheapest to fire) are 
dismissed. Holzer (1986) and Biller (1980) propose that the last hired will be the first 
fired. All in all, layoffs may weaken the organization by damaging the reputation of 
the public sector organizations and leading to lower-quality job applicants 
(Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980). Thus, the work-force layoffs should be viewed 
“only as a last resort measure” and the managers should try to prevent using layoffs 
for adjusting the workload (Ibid).  
 
In sum, hiring freeze has generally been seen as a more attractive option than layoffs 
because it tends to be more humane and creates less insecurity and uncertainty than 
layoffs as people do not have to worry about losing their jobs, and the morale of the 
organization is not likely to be affected so negatively as with layoffs (Cayer 1986; 
Rubin 1985). 
 
When looking at the non-personnel expenditures and related instruments for making 
cuts, restricting or banning spending on utilities, supplies, equipment, travel and 
communication are listed by numerous authors (see, e.g., Lewis and Logalbo 1980; 
Wolman and Davis 1980).  
 
                                                     
10
 E.g., the experience in the city of Cincinnati shows that the attrition plan adopted by the authorities 
(one-for-three hire back policy) started to erode the labor force in an erratic manner (Levine, Rubin and 
Wolohojian 1981, p. 621). 
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3.1.2. Program measures and investments 
Program measures are seen as decreases in transfers to the citizens (e.g. entitlements) 
but also changes in expenditure that lead to reduced levels of public services provided 
to the citizens (Dunsire and Hood 1989; Lewis and Logalbo 1980; Kogan 1981). The 
specific tools for cutting the costs of service provision differ according to the policy 
sectors
11
 (Lewis and Logalbo 1980). Often savings are achieved by manipulating the 
goals or reducing the quality of a service or a product. Dunsire and Hood (1989) point 
out that different streamlining and quality reducing activities are aimed either at 
smoothing out the inputs or leveling down the outputs of public services. The former 
entails activities such as formalizing access by clients, standardizing forms and 
treatments, establishing quotas, raising prices, etc. The latter includes predominantly 
reducing the variety of service tasks, fixing the quality of treatment, reducing the 
frequency of service provision (e.g. of garbage collection), reducing the service hours 
(e.g. libraries), reducing the number of service outlets (Dunsire and Hood 1989; 
Lewis and Logalbo 1980, p. 187). In addition, changing the nature of service 
providers (by using part-time, third-party or volunteer counterparts) is described as 
the predominant method to achieve cutbacks in the levels of public services provided 
(Dunsire and Hood 1989). Lee (1981, p. 47) also mentions transforming the services 
required to be provided by law into discretionary services.  
 
Among the cutback instruments that deal with transfers, the options involve, for 
example, straightforward cutbacks in the coverage or size of the entitlement 
payments, but shifting part of the entitlement costs to the private sector, citizens or 
just further away from the central government budget is also common (e.g. by making 
the employers pay part of the sickness fund payments, increasing waiting times and 
delaying payments, establishing item charges and user fees for services) (see, e.g., 
Dunsire and Hood 1989; Hood and Wright 1981, pp. 188, 211). Briefly put, reducing 
the expectations of customers and loading off work and other expenses to different 
affected counterparts is common when cutting programs.  
 
Capital expenditures are often curtailed by applying different “postponement” or 
“cancellation” tactics, such as capital spending freeze for new capital projects, 
deferral of nonessential capital projects, and deferral of maintenance (Lewis and 
Logalbo 1980; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). Several authors, however, warn 
against postponing maintenance. It may be a useful short-term strategy, but from a 
longer-term perspective it may aggravate organizations’ problems if the cumulative 
decline in resources becomes significant (Behn 1980a, p. 615). Therefore the future 
costs of postponing maintenance might be far in excess of today’s savings and may 
lead to subsequent and more costly capital acquisition (Lewis and Logalbo 1980; 
McTighe 1979, p. 89). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 For example, in educational services shortening the school day, increasing the teacher-pupil ratio, 
cutting back on the amount of different teaching materials have been applied (Hood and Wright 1981; 
Lewis and Logalbo 1980). In recreational, grounds and maintenance programs the use of part-time 
staffing has been common (Ibid). 
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Table 2: Main cutback instruments 
Category  Instrument 
Operational expenditures 
Personnel costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-personnel costs 
Reduced overtime or working time 
Slowing-down of promotion 
Early retirement 
Wage freeze 
Reduction in the rate of salary increase 
Filling positions with less credentialed, lower-paid staff 
Reducing pay grades of vacated job lots 
Salary cuts 
Reshuffling of staff
12
 
Furlough 
Hiring freeze 
Layoff 
Spending limits and bans on utilities, supplies, equipment, 
travel, communications, etc. 
Program expenditures 
 Cut service provision 
Shorten the reception time, limit service hours 
Reduce the frequency of service provision, reduce the number 
of service outlets 
Reduce the quality requirements for service provision 
Program termination 
Engage voluntary, part-time and third-party counterparts in 
service provision 
Reduce transfers 
Shift part of the entitlement costs to the private sector or 
citizens  
Investments/capital expenditures 
 Capital spending freeze for new/ nonessential capital projects 
Transfer of cost to private capital 
Postponing procurement 
Deferral of maintenance 
 
 
3.2. The main expenditure categories hit by cutbacks 
 
3.2.1. Theoretical discussion 
Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 144) claim that the vulnerability of different expenditure 
categories to cutbacks is definitely not a random process and “what will be thrown to 
the wolves first” can be predicted to a certain extent. Briefly put, there are a number 
of competing and contradicting theoretical predictions with regard to the question of 
which expenditure categories are to suffer more and/or first in line during the 
imposition of cuts. In the following section the most prevalent approaches in the 
cutback management literature, mainly originating from public-choice theory and the 
administrative-response model, are summarized. 
 
                                                     
12
 According to Rubin (1980) this refers to creating pools of resources (e.g. by making increased use of 
temporary staff and teaching assistants). 
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The “typical” public-choice view of bureaucrats’ behavior would predict that given 
officials are rational and self-interested, they would try to cut administrative 
expenditure less than other categories of expenditure (Mattila and Uusikylä 1997, p. 
149). In contrast, proceeding from interest-group theories, Lewis and Logalbo (1980, 
p. 186) conjecture that administrative services would be particularly vulnerable to 
cuts, because they “usually lack support by a vocal client or citizen group.”  
 
Several authors have hypothesized about the prevalence of cutbacks to different 
expenditure categories by looking at the sequence of cuts over time. Glennerster 
(1981, p. 186) proposes that when politicians are faced with the necessity of cutting 
real spending, the administrative costs are first in line. Also Downs and Rocke (1984, 
p. 337) argue, according to the “bureaucratic process theory”, the city authorities 
would respond to declining revenues by cutting down the operational expenditures 
first in the following preference ordering: 1) administrative salaries; 2) non-
administrative salaries; 3) operating expenses, supplies, materials; 4) equipment; 5) 
maintenance. Dunsire and Hood (1989) claim that expenditures to be cut first in line 
“in hard times” depend on what are considered the “core” (whatever activities, 
functional groups, positions or resources considered as principal) by those responsible 
for cutting down the public expenditure. Hence it is predicted that the “core”-related 
expenditure categories will be cut less. In addition, Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 93) 
argue that “hard-pressed but objective officials” would first of all apply “whatever 
quick-acting levers of control they possess, before … they deploy controls … slower 
to take effect”. Thus, they conjecture that most probably the first target of cuts (at 
least at the outset of cutbacks) are public services and goods (as opposed to spending 
on grants or transfer payments) given that officials probably cut costs they have most 
control of, but grants and transfers are very much policy-led and determined ( Ibid, 
pp. 37-38). 
 
Several authors propose that subjecting certain expenditure categories to cuts depends 
on the acuteness of the fiscal stress. Bartle (1996) conjectures that according to the 
administrative-response model proposed by Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian (1981), 
slow or no growth would lead to denial and delay (e.g. deferring maintenance, 
drawing down fund balances, shifting expenses forward); moderate decline would 
bring about decremental approaches (like across-the-board cuts); severe revenue 
decline would elicit termination of programs, reduction (or contracting out) of 
services, and layoffs. Schick (1980, p. 127) claims that in acute scarcity the 
government would first opt for cutting administrative and overhead costs and 
maintenance activities.  
 
3.2.2. Empirical evidence 
Proceeding from the categories of public expenditure presented in the previous 
subsection, this section provides an overview of the empirical results of different 
studies looking at the distribution of cuts among different expenditure categories (and 
within personnel costs in more detail). 
 
The empirical evidence at hand demonstrates that very often capital spending and 
expenditures on maintenance are the first and predominant target of cuts both at the 
central government and state/local level (Bowling and Burke 2006; Dunsire and Hood 
1989, p. 90; Hood and Wright 1981, p. 203; Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 1981; 
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Maher and Deller 2007; Marando 1990; Midwinter and Page 1981; Wolman and 
Davis 1980). Dunsire and Hood (1989) show that due to the fact that capital 
expenditure suffers most, the programs that deal predominantly with the formation of 
fixed capital are extremely vulnerable during retrenchment.  
 
Secondly, also operating expenses seem to bear a heavy burden during the 
retrenchment of public spending (Berne and Stiefel 1993; Maher and Deller 2007; 
Marando 1990; Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 1981). When comparing the division 
of cuts in the different categories of expenditures outlined in section 3.2.1., it appears 
that some studies find that maintaining employment and keeping the salaries is 
preferred to maintaining the status quo of program measures (Levine 1985; Wolman 
and Davis 1980). In contrast, Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 93) find that transfers 
(grants, pensions and benefit payments) are cut after the purchases of goods and 
services (including salaries and wages), because the latter are quicker acting and more 
effective than controls on transfers.  
 
When looking at the cuts within personnel costs, then with regard to salary 
reductions, a number of studies have found that salary reductions have been enacted 
when cutting the positions and freezing employment have not provided the expected 
savings (e.g., Berne and Stiefel 1993; Wolman and Davis 1980). Lewis (1988), 
however, observes that in making cutbacks to personnel, layoffs were more widely 
used than salary decreases.  
 
Hiring freeze and leaving jobs vacant has been a very prominent and frequent 
measure of cutting personnel expenditure, applied also commonly as the first remedy 
during crisis to achieve cutbacks (Bowling and Burke 2006; Dougherty and Klase 
2009; Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 1981; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010; Wolman 
and Davis 1980). Levine (1985) demonstrates that “freezing unfilled vacancies” is 
especially the case in low fiscal stress with limited duration. Lee (1981) notes that 
during the retrenchment under Thatcherism the vast majority of job losses were 
brought about by the natural wastage of a hiring freeze. Also Dunsire and Hood 
(1989, p. 17) demonstrate that just after taking office the Thatcher government 
announced steep personnel cuts mainly by a ban on recruitment.  
 
Regarding the layoffs, the empirical evidence is contradictory. Some authors note that 
dismissals have been applied as the last way out (Bowling and Burke 2006; Maher 
and Deller 2007; Marando 1990; Packard et al. 2007; Wolman and Davis 1980), but 
some observe that this has been one of the most prominent methods when striving for 
budget cutbacks (Lewis 1988; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).
13
 Hood and Wright 
(1981, p. 211) point out that during the retrenchment in Whitehall a lot of effort was 
aimed at saving jobs in the public service (e.g. by cutting the non-core expenditures of 
education in order to retain teachers). There is also evidence that “the actual” laying 
off of the workers is often circumvented by applying “paper cuts” and “fairy gold” 
tactics. For example Hood (1981, p. 107) forwards that during the “Pliatzky cuts”14 
addressed at cutting down the (number and also size) of non-departmental 
                                                     
13
 The occurrence of layoffs is linked to several variables ranging from municipal unions’ capacity to 
make concessions (Pew Charitable Trust 2009) to the severity and phase of fiscal stress (Levine, Rubin 
and Wolohojian 1981). 
14
Cuts announced in early 1980 in Britain, concerning the non-departmental bodies of the government, 
based on a report by Sir Leo Pliatzky, a distinguished civil servant of Whitehall.  
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organizations in Britain, a vast share of the positions abolished were advisory and 
unpaid.  
 
Several authors demonstrate that cuts in personnel do not hit all groups of civil 
servants equally. Based on their study on cutbacks in Whitehall during the “lean 
decade” from 1975 to 1985 Dunsire and Hood (1989, pp. 107, 199) conclude that 
blue-collar workers suffered more than white-collar workers
15
 and the highest and 
lowest ranks more severely than the middle ranks. They also found that secretarial 
positions were the first targets when the cuts began, but find no support for the 
common proposition that “bottom”16 grades are cut first (Ibid, pp. 97, 105). Holzer 
(1986, p. 90)
17
 has demonstrated that women and minorities statistically bore the 
brunt of cutbacks disproportionately in the early 1980s. Similarly, also Rubin (1985, 
p. 45) shows that a cutback process in the early 1980s in the US “had a built-in bias 
against women and minorities”. Retention status depended on career tenure, seniority, 
military experience and performance evaluation; consequently, the first ones let go 
were probationary personnel, nonveterans and those with less seniority (Ibid).  
 
Table 3: Expenditure categories addressed during the cutback management: 
findings of empirical studies 
Author Expenditure category cut the most 
Berne and Stiefel 
(1993) 
Less essential services were cut more than essential ones. 
Capital and maintenance expenditure cut more than operating costs. 
Bowling and 
Burke (2006) 
Most extensive use of following instruments: attempts to improve productivity, hiring 
freeze, cutting capital outlays. The least utilized were: reducing salaries and personnel 
layoffs. Similar patterns prevailed in 1984.  
Dunsire and Hood 
(1989, p. 107)  
The blue-collar workers suffered more than the white-collar workers. 
Levine (1985)  25% of departments lay off employees, decreased overtime use, slowed promotion rates 
and 52% of departments terminated programs. 
Maher and Deller 
(2007) 
Among the expenditure strategies for dealing with fiscal stress, the local officials’ most 
preferred options were delaying capital expenditures and delaying routine maintenance. 
The least preferred strategies are layoffs. 
Marando (1990) Most predominant expenditure categories decreased were: operating expenditures, capital 
expenditures, layoffs, hiring freezes, cutting service levels. 
Packard et al. 
(2007) 
The most frequently used action to reduce costs were: hiring freeze, travelling restrictions 
and purchasing restrictions, whereas the least frequently used were layoffs and filling 
positions with less credentialed, lower-paid staff. 
Schick (1988, p. 
525) 
A number of industrialized nations achieved cutbacks via lowering the adjustment for 
inflation in agency operating expenses. 
Scorsone and 
Plerhoples (2010) 
Most cities implemented hiring freezes and layoffs; also delays and cancellations of 
infrastructure projects. 
Wolman and 
Davis (1980)  
Capital-improvement projects and maintenance was a prime target for cutbacks 
(governments preferred to maintain the existing levels of employment and budget totals). 
At the same time, in some cities cuts were made to the real wages by increasing the wages 
at a lower rate than inflation.  
Wright (1981, p. 
16)  
Hood and Wright 
Decremental cutbacks focusing on “protecting the core” have been popular in the UK in 
the 1970s. E.g. cuts in the education sector were applied to the noncore elements such as 
school meals, adult education and nursery schools, whereas the teaching of the 5-16-year-
                                                     
15
 During that decade the civil-service staff number fell by 15%. With the total cut of 153,600 the 
white-collars lost ca 12% of their staff, whereas the blue-collars lost ca 45% of their staff (Dunsire and 
Hood 1989, p.189). 
16
 “Bottom” is referred to as the lowest level of white-collars (see Dunsire and Hood 1989, p.96).  
17
 Bach (2012) claims that austerity measures are highly gendered because of the greater proportion of 
women in public sector employment and because women are hit hardest as services are withdrawn. 
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(1981, p. 211). old suffered marginally. In Britain there are several examples where the aim has been to 
retain teachers but cut back on books or heating. 
 Expenditure category cut first 
Dunsire and Hood 
(1989, p. 90-3); 
Hood and Wright 
(1981) 
Cuts in capital spending were carried out before cuts in current spending both at the 
central-government and local levels.  
Dunsire and Hood 
(1989, p. 93) 
Purchases (of goods and services) are cut before the transfers (pensions and grants, benefit 
payments). Controls on purchases are quicker and more effective than controls on 
transfers. 
Hood and Wright 
(1981, p. 186)  
When politicians are faced with the necessity of cutting real spending, the administrative 
costs are first in line. 
Levine, Rubin and 
Wolohojian 
(1981) 
Deferring maintenance and capital expenditures and imposing hiring freeze were the 
cutbacks measures followed by cutbacks of personnel (in the form of selective cuts, based 
on prior growth, administrative concerns and political priorities) and disinvestment of city 
functions to other levels of government (court, university, hospital). 
Postponing new projects, delaying capital projects, shifting money from capital funds to 
maintenance and drawing down reserves were first applied. When the fiscal stress became 
more severe, the authorities went ahead with cuts in departments’ expenditure and 
personnel. 
Wolman and 
Davis (1980) 
Work force was usually reduced in two phases, first hiring freeze, which led to reductions 
through attrition and then, if that was not enough, layoffs. 
 
3.3. The main sectors hit by cutbacks 
 
3.3.1. Theoretical insights 
The theoretical discussion on which policy areas and programs would bear the 
heaviest burden during the cutbacks is rather diffuse, being rooted both in popular 
expectations and scholarly endeavors to analyze the process of retrenchment. The 
“winners” and “losers” of cutbacks have been explained by applying different 
variables ranging from larger demographic and historic trends to the complexity of a 
department’s budget (see Dunsire and Hood 1989). As Dunsire and Hood (Ibid, p. 55) 
put it: “there is no lack of theory which can be applied to produce testable hypotheses 
about how cutback management process will operate.”18 Broadly put, the factors 
brought out in the existing scholarly discussions can be divided into “external” (or 
“environmental”) and “internal” factors. In the following, these two sets of factors (or 
“variables”) will be looked at in turn.  
 
Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 31) argue that “external” variables, like historical, 
demographic, industrial and employment market trends, are likely to influence shifts 
in government spending
19
 (and thereby also in cutting back). Thus, they conjecture 
that these “trend” variables help to predict the future by looking at what happened in 
the past. In other words they state that taking either extrapolation or reversal as a trend 
mechanism, both predict that the past trend will go into reverse when the 
retrenchment period comes about (Ibid, p. 29). 
 
                                                     
18
 In their book on cutback management in the UK during 1975-1985 Dunsire and Hood (1989) set forth a series of 
theories on who suffers most during the period of retrenchment. They develop 64 hypotheses in four different 
categories of variables – party-political explanations, trend explanations, bureaucratic process explanations and 
bureaucratic self-interest explanations. 
19 They apply the logic on programs, departments, personnel groups, spending authorities etc.  
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The “internal” factors that are likely to influence which sectors lose and which win (or 
lose less) in the case of cutbacks can be divided in the following way: ideological 
leanings of the governing parties, office-seeking considerations of the politicians, the 
influence of interest groups and the characteristics of programs.  
 
First, it has been conjectured that the ideological coloring of the governing party (or 
parties) is likely to influence the content of cutback decisions. Thus, for example, the 
right-leaning and conservative parties can be expected to be committed to higher 
spending on defense and “law and order” while the left-leaning parties would support 
the shielding of social services from extensive cuts (Dunsire and Hood 1989, p. 25). 
 
Second, according to the rational-actor models of politicians’ behavior, the decision-
makers are expected to be motivated by office-seeking and re-election goals and 
hence would make cuts in those areas that would maximize their chances of re-
election. Based on these theoretical considerations, one would expect that politicians 
target the cuts in those areas and sectors that would not directly hurt their 
constituencies. Thus, they would focus the cuts on more “marginal groups” (i.e. 
groups that lack resources for mobilizing themselves) in order to minimize the vote 
losses for the next election (Mattila and Uusikylä 1997, pp. 148-149; see also Dunsire 
and Hood 1989, pp. 24-26).  
 
Third, related to the electoral considerations but still worth pointing out as a separate 
factor is the influence of interest groups. According to Downs and Rocke (1984, p. 
338) interest-group theory would predict that the size of the cut any agency has to 
face would depend on the influence that the given agency and the interest groups 
affiliated with this agency have on decision-makers. Therefore, sectors like police and 
fire protection would be cut less than politically weaker and less influential programs 
like parks and recreation (Ibid). Similarly, Hartley (1981) argues that policy areas 
with influential interest groups, such as defense, are hard to ignore by voter-conscious 
governments during retrenchment, especially if these interest groups have strong 
employment and multiplier effects. Based on this logic it is conjectured that those 
programs that have vocal proponents and are represented by strong interest groups 
would be cut least (Mattila and Uusikylä 1997, p. 150). Drawing on Klein (1976) and 
the pressure-group theory, Dunsire and Hood (1989) explain that whether the client 
groups are organized and powerful depends on the immediate benefits of the 
programs. They predict that programs that are very general in their impact and vague 
about their immediate benefits (mainly those providing public goods such as defense 
or law and order) will suffer more during retrenchment than programs with strong 
client groups.  
 
Finally, the characteristics of the programs can be expected to influence whether they 
face cutbacks or not (Dunsire and Hood 1989). Drawing on Klein (1976) Dunsire and 
Hood (1989) expect that cuts in programs depend on the requisite mix of programs’ 
“economic significance”, “administrative feasibility and time-horizon” and 
“commitment of expenditure outside governments’ control”.20 They conjecture that 
                                                     
20 Economic significance refers to the degree to which programs pre-empt resources directly (employ people or 
buy goods) vs just rearrange resources; administrative feasibility and time-horizon determine whether programs 
can be implemented and also ceased quickly and easily or not; committing governments to expenditure outside 
their control refers to the degree to which the programs are dependent on external factors such as demographic 
trends the government cannot alter.  
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programs “moving the money” around (e.g. transfer payments) will be cut first and 
more than programs committing resources directly (heavy on purchases and 
services
21
) and that governments are eager to abandon programs with open-ended 
commitments and reduce rates of payment (and government commitment in general) 
wherever possible (Ibid, pp. 46, 113). Hood and Wright (1981) and Mattila and 
Uusikylä (1997, p. 152) conjecture that “the biggest spenders” (i.e. larger programs) 
would be likely to cut more than smaller programs (in relative terms), given that 
larger programs can be expected to absorb cuts more easily.
22
 Schick (1980) predicts 
that in the situation of acute scarcity, the governments would first cut discretionary 
programs (e.g. libraries and museums) rather than mandatory programs. Furthermore, 
theoretical discussions predict that programs for which there are matching funds from 
the national level would be less likely cut by subnational governments (Levine and 
Posner 1981).  
 
3.3.2. Empirical evidence 
When explaining the occurrence and predominance of cuts in different fields in the 
UK, Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 86) find that the external (or what they call “trend 
variables”) “seem to have done quite well”. They found in their study that 
demographic trends (increase in the population of old-aged and decrease in school-
aged) predicted the changes in spending on education and social security – the social-
security payments were not cut, whereas the spending on education was curbed. Also 
the socio-technical change predicted cutbacks in the decline of blue-collar workers 
(due to economizing), who suffered more than any other group of public employees. 
Still, they conclude that trend predictions are predictions of change in general terms, 
not of the amount of change.  
 
The empirical evidence about the impact of political ideology and electoral 
considerations is mixed. Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 77) find little support for their 
hypotheses related to political ideology and vote-seeking behavior by stating that after 
the general elections (change of governing party) in the UK no predicted clear-cut 
change occurred in the spending pattern related to the programs. All in all they (Ibid) 
conclude that party-political explanations give mixed results, but more often tend to 
fail in predicting the targets of cutback during the retrenchment period. Mattila and 
Uusikylä (1997), however, find in their study of cutbacks in Finland in 1991-1995 
that marginal programs (e.g. mental health care, alcoholic care, disability allowances) 
and administrative programs were cut more than other service programs. Thus, the 
Finnish case appears to support the vote-maximizing hypothesis of politicians’ 
behavior. 
 
With regard to the influence of interest groups, the existing empirical evidence is, 
again, rather mixed. A number of studies in the US cities and counties demonstrate 
that the largest expenditure reductions during the fiscal stress have been faced by 
public works (Wolman and Davis 1980, p. 242; West and Davis 1988), public parks 
and recreational services (Lewis 1988; Shubik, Horwitz and Ginsberg 2009; Post 
Commission 1979) and public library services (Fitzgerald 1979; Schick 1983; Shubik, 
                                                     
21 This means that much of their spending goes to wages and salaries. 
22
 Klein (1976) (in Dunsire and Hood 1989) cautions that large programs are very hard to change because it takes 
considerable shifts to make more than a marginal adjustment. 
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Horwitz and Ginsberg 2009; Post Commission 1979). At the same time the areas that 
least suffered have predominantly been police and fire services (Fitzgerald 1979; 
Lewis 1988). These appear to support the conjectures based on the interest-groups 
politics framework. Still, it has to be mentioned that Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 
(1981) come to the opposite conclusion, namely that fire services have suffered the 
most, whereas parks and recreational services were spared from the cuts. Based on 
British experience in the 1970s Hartley (1981, pp. 138-9) demonstrates that defense 
expenditure has not been susceptible to large-scale cuts in the short run and Kogan 
(1981, pp. 152-3) shows that no radical cuts were applied in education policy. The 
latter then provides contradictory support to the theoretical prediction stating that 
programs that are very general in their impact and vague about the immediate benefits 
are cut more. 
 
When looking at the impacts of program characteristics, the absolute size of a 
program seems to be a poor predictor of incidence of cuts, as neither Mattila and 
Uusikylä (1997) nor Dunsire and Hood (1989) found evidence for the hypothesis that 
larger programs would be cut more than smaller programs.
23
 The hypothesis of 
“matching funds” is supported by Wolman and Davis (1980), who demonstrate in 
their study that in making cuts, cities tried to protect those programs for which there 
were matching general funds (given that making cuts to federally supported programs 
would have led to disproportionate effects on the size of their budgets). 
 
Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 119) demonstrate that programs whose (own) staff costs 
(salaries, wages and pensions) made up a high proportion of expenditure, suffered less 
than others (with the exception of education programs).
24
 No evidence is found for the 
hypothesis that programs heavy on “goods and services”, such as defense, health, 
public order and safety, education, recreation and culture, are cut earlier/more heavily 
than those heavy on “moving money around”, such as social security, agriculture, 
transport and housing. Rather “if anything, the opposite is true” (Ibid, p. 115). A 
much better predictor seems to be the “capital intensiveness” – Dunsire and Hood 
(Ibid, p. 117) found that in Whitehall during 1977-1985 the programs that suffered 
most were housing and community amenities and transport and communications.  
 
                                                     
23
 Still, Dunsire and Hood (1989, p.169) bring a reverse example from Whitehall in 1922 – the 
government expenditure was aimed to be cut by ca 30% and the main targets were the biggest 
spenders, mainly the Defence, as “only from them the money of that order could be found.”  
24
 In addition, they find that during the staff cutbacks the departments dealing predominantly with 
“policy matters” were more likely to face cuts through “adjustment”, such as changes in workload or 
general streamlining, whereas the departments of public service, trading and general support functions 
faced more harsh measures, such as dropping the functions, contracting out, hiving off, etc. (Ibid, 162). 
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Table 4: Cutbacks by sectors: which areas are likely to be cut first, which are 
protected: findings of empirical studies 
Authors Cut back first/cut back the most Spared from cuts/cut back the 
least 
Dunsire and Hood (1989) “Capital heavy” spending programs 
e.g., buildings, plants, roads, housing 
and community amenities and transport 
& communication  
 
Fitzgerald (1979) Library services, summer school Police and fire services 
Hood and Wright (1981) Industrial programs were down by 40% 
(in 1980/81 compared to 1974/75) and 
the programs on housing, agriculture, 
roads and transport up by 30%  
The area of social security and 
health recognized expanding 
programs during the same period 
Kogan (1981)   Education (areas where service 
providers hold a great deal of 
discretion) 
Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian (1981) Fire department Parks, recreation 
Lewis 1988 Streets and highways, parks and 
recreation, general administration 
Police, fire protection 
Mattila and Uusikylä (1997) 
 
 
 
 
Marginal programs (e.g. mental health 
care, alcoholic care, disability 
allowances) and administrative 
programs. 
Among transfers: certain categories of 
pensions (old-age pensions, 
unemployment pensions, and spouses’ 
pensions 
Medical-expense refunds, refunds 
for doctors’ services, housing 
allowances and orphans’ pensions 
Post Commission (1979) Public library services, parks, cultural 
activities, recreation 
 
Schick (1983) Discretionary programs  
Shubik, Horwitz and Ginsberg (2009) Libraries, recreational facilities, 
rubbish collection 
 
West and Davis (1988) Public works, parks, recreational 
services 
Public safety 
Wolman and Davis (1980) Public works, general government, 
social services 
Public safety, parks, recreation 
and culture 
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4. Changes in public management 
 
During the era of retrenchment, changes in public management practices are inherent 
because of the need to adapt to changes both in the internal and the external 
environment. As Jorgensen (1987) puts it, authorities try “to regulate the boundary 
between organization and its environment”. How scarce resources are perceived and 
reacted to by the management is shaped by both the “objective”25 characteristics of 
the cutbacks and various contextual conditions both inside and outside the 
organizations (Jick and Murray 1982, p. 159). The following overview addresses five 
sub-fields within public management which have been identified and analyzed by the 
previous studies in relation to cutbacks: centralization and decentralization of 
decision-making, budgeting and financial management, human resource management, 
performance management, and management of change. Whereas some of these sub-
fields address aspects of how the cutbacks have been implemented, the others look at 
the impact of cutbacks on organizational practices. In addition to that, management 
literature is often normative with providing solutions for handling the crisis. It has to 
be recognized that the empirical evidence is sometimes limited to individual case 
studies which illustrate normative argumentation but make it difficult to draw broader 
generalizations on public management patterns. 
4.1. Centralization/decentralization of decision-making 
 
Centralization pushes the governments towards moving substantial powers to the 
center of the government and is therefore considered inherent in any sort of crisis 
management and decision-making (Boin et al. 2008). It is widely accepted that 
financial decline triggers movement towards mechanistic structures and hierarchy-
based procedures in organizations, first and foremost, because budgeting, naturally 
assumed to be in the domain of the chief executive, comes into the spotlight 
(Bozeman 2010; Peters 2011, p. 77; Stern and Sundelius 1997).  
Centralization of decision-making can even be seen as a necessary pre-condition for 
undertaking retrenchment. As several authors (Behn 1980b; Heffron 1989; Levine 
1985) have argued, centralization of decision-making during retrenchment is 
necessary because the organizational subunits would be very unlikely to volunteer the 
making of cuts. Organizations and their sub-units tend to believe to have very “special 
characteristics” not suitable for cuts (Dunsire and Hood 1989, p. 131). “It would be a 
very unusual organization indeed that generated through a decentralized process 
enough proposals for self-imposed cutbacks to match a significant decline in 
resources” (Behn 1980a, p. 619). Levine (1979, p. 181) also notes that appeals for 
voluntary budget-cutting are likely to elicit a “you first, then me” type of responses 
from lower levels of organizations, implying that top-down decisions would be 
needed to go ahead with cuts. This has led Behn (1985) to argue that cutback 
                                                     
25
 For instance, the objective characteristics of cutbacks entail the severity of the cuts, the time pressure 
involved and whether the cuts could be anticipated or not (Jick and Murray 1982, p. 160). Contextual 
factors, such as the individual characteristics of key decision-makers and differences in organization 
design are also likely to play a role (Ibid).  
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decision-making requires centralization and a top-down approach. Bozeman and 
Straussman also state that “top-down processes are virtually indispensable for the 
achievement of systematic spending cuts” (1982, p. 172).  
 
Moving towards centralization can be achieved either through standardization of 
procedures, empowering the central budgetary departments, setting limits and ceilings 
to organizational spending, borrowing and activities, or by general priority-setting of 
the government (Peters 2011; Pollitt 2010). As the cutback management is 
predominantly about difficult political choices on priorities and strategies based in the 
central government machinery (Wilks 2010, p. 105), many authors (Behn 1980a, 
1980b; Boin et al. 2008; Schick 1986, p. 128) note that the centralization goes beyond 
budgetary decision-making. A common strategy for strengthening control is changing 
the venues of decision-making, typically by appointing the management boards to 
public agencies or other bodies that governments can control (Peters and Pierre 2004, 
pp. 4-5). In addition, several authors (Kickert 2012; Peters 2011, pp. 77-78; Peters, 
Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011) point out that a typical feature related to governments 
managing the fiscal crisis is the centralization of the decision-making process around 
the political elite and distancing “the career civil service” from the key actors. Even 
technocratic and operational decisions commonly in the responsibility of officials 
might move into the political arena during cutback management (Peters 2011); public 
service can be cast aside because it is treated as part of the problem resistant to 
changes, but not part of the solution (Peters and Pierre 2004).  
Centralization of decision-making also affects the behavior of public sector leaders. 
Several authors have argued that centralized leadership, aimed at securing that the 
cutback decisions are accepted by the rest of the organization, is crucial. Behn (1980a, 
p. 619) claims that among other aspects, leadership for cutback management 
“involves establishing the inevitability of resource decline and dramatizing the 
opportunity costs of not cutting-back”. In addition, an important role of the managers 
in achieving savings is seen in continuous encouragement and rewarding of “the cost 
consciousness and spirit of value for money in the senior staff” (Dunsire and Hood 
1989, p. 146). A few authors go even further with such a top-down approach by 
stating that public leaders have an essential role in persuading also the wider public of 
the necessity of cutback measures and alleviating the hard times (e.g. Boin et al. 2008; 
Lewis and Logalbo 1980, p. 187). 
Numerous empirical studies appear to confirm the prediction of centralization of 
authority and decision-making during cutbacks (see, e.g., Levine, Rubin and 
Wolohojian 1981). Midwinter and Page (1981) and Greenwood (1981) demonstrate 
that when the Thatcher government aimed at “rolling back the state”, the Whitehall 
became very “interventionist” by applying different centrally controlled schemes for 
cutting back government spending. Throughout the cutback era in the UK, the 
centralization and integration of different functions (resource allocation, policy 
planning, research and intelligence, personnel and management) occurred. The use of 
different centralized planning systems (commonly based on policy areas) enabling 
deeper policy analysis were increasingly adopted by departments in order to obtain 
the centrally allocated resources. In the health sector, the system of financial 
allocation and control was reorganized with the aim of more rational resource 
planning allowing the center to be more intensely involved in making decisions and 
setting priorities. (Wright 1981) This has led Dunsire and Hood (1989, p. 216) to call 
the Thatcher government the most centralizing government of the 20
th
 century. 
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Although many authors relate efficient cutback management to the government’s 
ability to centralize and take control (Wilks 2010), there are also opposing views. 
Decentralization is seen as an enabling factor for faster and better-informed decision-
making, and for upholding employee morale. Boin and his co-authors (2008, pp. 53-4) 
even caution that “centralization may … fuel rather than dampen crisis” pointing to 
the fact that centralization hampers flexibility and quick engagement of expert 
knowledge on the “ground staff” essential in fast crisis decision-making. The latter 
view is also shared by Bombyk and Chernesky (1986), Weatherly (1984) and Massey 
(2011), who emphasize the importance of power sharing in decision-making and more 
bottom-up approaches. In times of crisis, high-quality political analysis and thus also 
the intense engagement of competent public officials gains utmost importance, 
because the time factor and quality information flow is critical (e.g. Kickert 2012; 
Pollitt 2010). Furthermore, some authors emphasize the importance of involving the 
target groups of services and population at large in decision-making over the 
cutbacks. For example, Lewis and Logalbo (1980, p. 187) suggest that managers 
“make use of public hearings, polls, referenda, questionnaires in newspapers, and 
other mechanisms for soliciting and informing public opinion and for establishing 
priorities and policy.” 
 
On the organizational level, several authors suggest bottom-up processes by 
increasing communication between top management and employees to clarify the 
cutback process, demystify the decisions to be taken, explain what the future holds for 
the organization and diffuse rumors and resulting tensions (Cayer 1986; Ingraham and 
Barrilleaux 1983, p. 400; Levine 1984; McTighe 1979). McTighe (1979, p. 89) 
emphasizes that it is important to keep “open the lines of communication” and 
different venues during the formulation of the cutback strategy. In addition to 
providing information, the employees should be given opportunities to actively 
participate in the process of “determining the future course of organizational cutback” 
(McTighe 1979, p. 89). For that, it has been recommended to involve employees in 
the preparation of cutbacks and in the organizational long-term planning process 
(Chadwick et al. 2004; Levine 1984).  
 
Decision-making power could be passed to program managers or even to street-level 
bureaucrats, whose choices are viewed as better informed (Dunsire and Hood 1989, p. 
36). In such cases, lower levels in organizational hierarchy need to decide what 
exactly and how to cut (for example, in the framework of the selective cash limits and 
across-the-board cuts). However, relying strongly on the administrative apparatus or 
other sources of expert advice can serve the aim to obscure or shift blame (Boin et al. 
2008, p. 151; Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011). Posner and Blöndal (2012, p. 29) 
call the delegation of hard choices to agencies the “time honored strategy” of 
scattering political responsibility. From another perspective, Holzer (1986) questions 
the integrity of decentralized cutbacks with the example of personnel policy by 
pointing to possible violations intended to help particular individuals in the course of 
awarding inflated performance appraisal ratings based upon friendships. Levine 
(1979, p. 181), in turn, warns against the “participation paradox” by arguing that the 
participation in the case of cutbacks is likely to elicit resistance and protective 
behavior by the participating actors. 
 
Kickert (2012a, b) claims (de)centralization to be dependent on the phase and 
acuteness of the crisis – he found that the banking crisis of 2008 led to highly 
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centralized decision-making, but the 2009 economic and 2010 fiscal crisis did not, as 
the subsequent phases of crisis were not so urgent. The empirical evidence from the 
mid-1970s in Britain also demonstrates that both centralization and decentralization 
can be used during the retrenchment. Namely, the response of local authorities to the 
declining public resources differed ─ both centralization of policy planning, and 
adoption of a decentralized and participatory form of management occurred (Wright 
1981, p. 21). Besides that, Rubin’s case studies of the US universities and cities 
(1980) provide grounds to claim that to cope with retrenchment, administrators need 
flexibility and authorities seek to re-create flexibilities at the lower level of decision-
making between appropriations. Another proof of a decentralized structure is seen in 
the example of the “ministerial management” in Whitehall during Thatcherism where 
cutting public spending was delegated to the ministerial level (Lee 1981, p. 39). The 
ministers were expected to take initiative and strong lead in the cutback management 
as the aim of the government was to make use of the “drive” at the ministerial level 
(Ibid). The whole retrenchment endeavor relied on periodic reviews “on the tasks 
performed and the resources committed to those tasks”, conducted by staff at the 
ministerial level. Based on this, the minister was expected to assess the organization 
of resources and their responsiveness to the political goals (Ibid, pp. 42, p. 47). 
Besides the fact that the cutting back exercise depended strongly on the interpretations 
of each individual department, the “ministerial management” further empowered the 
ministerial level, as the reporting system provided the minister with the key 
information (Ibid, p. 53).  
When looking at the empirical evidence on the centralization/decentralization 
dilemma during cutbacks, no easily discernible pattern could be found. Altogether, 
one could argue that the centralization of governmental decision-making practices 
during cutbacks tends to be a prevailing approach, which is complemented by 
occasional endeavors to delegate authority to lower levels of hierarchy.  
 
4.2. Budgeting and financial management 
 
Fiscal stress is likely to induce changes to budgetary processes and budgetary 
institutions. In order to cope with acute scarcity, coping mechanisms such as 
repetitive budgeting (adopting a number of budgets during the fiscal year), 
sequestering, and cash-flow budgeting (Schick 1980; see also Heclo and Wildavsky 
1974) are likely to be deployed. As Schick (2009, p. 9) argues, the “the deeper the 
crisis, the more budgets the government prepares.” In addition to such “ad hockery” 
and “improvised” reactions needed to cope with immediate fiscal pressures, more 
systematic changes to budgetary institutions and practices may be produced by fiscal 
stress. The existing literature on fiscal governance and budgetary institutions shows 
that fiscal stress and the need to cut back budgets is likely to bring about a shift 
towards more centralized arrangements in fiscal governance, including the adoption 
of a more top-down approach to budgeting and increasing the power of the ministry of 
finance vis-à-vis the line ministries (and the minister of finance vis-à-vis the rest of 
the cabinet) (see, e.g., Behn 1985; Molander 2001; Di Mascio, Natalini and Stolfi, 
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forthcoming; Hendrick 1989; Schick 2009).
26
 As Schick (1986, p. 125) explains it, in 
times of growth, public agencies can formulate their requests with limited prior 
guidance, but when the budget is “targeted for contraction or stabilization”, an 
unconstrained, bottom-up process may lead to a conflict between the demanders and 
the constrainers when the former propose spending claims that would force the 
government to spend (and tax or borrow) more than it prefers. 
 
Empirical studies appear to confirm the prediction of centralization of budgetary 
decision-making during cutbacks (see, e.g., Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 1981; 
Hood and Wright 1981). Schick (1986, pp. 125-127), for example, notes that in 
response to fiscal stress, various OECD countries announced constrictive fiscal norms 
before the start of budget preparation. In particular, this took the form of giving line 
ministries and agencies targets or spending ceilings before they start formulating their 
budget requests for the following fiscal year. The goal of such targets was to constrain 
spending demands and to provide a focal point for subsequent negotiations between 
the finance ministry (or an equivalent) and the line ministries. Thus, fiscal stress (and 
the ensuing need to stabilize expenditure and reduce budget deficits) brought about a 
shift in the balance of power between the “guardians” (or “constrainers”) in the 
ministry of finance and the “claimers” in the line ministries or agencies during budget 
preparation and negotiations. Instead of the hitherto prevalent reactive role in the 
bottom-up budgetary process, the “guardians” assumed a more top-down and active 
role in budget preparation (and pre-preparation). (Schick 1986, p. 133) Top-down 
approaches were adopted, for example in Canada, Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands (Ibid). Schick (1988, p. 529) also finds that in response to fiscal stress, 
many governments started exercising “closer surveillance of spending than in the 
past”. In addition, he observes that in several OECD countries, multi-year budgetary 
frameworks were re-shaped to serve the restrictive fiscal goals (Schick 1986, p. 130). 
 
A number of studies have noted that continued fiscal stress also leads to centralizing 
tendencies in the relations between national and local governments (e.g. Stanley 
1980). Greenwood (1981) demonstrates that in the UK (1974-1980), spending at the 
local government level was strongly impacted by the expenditure targets set by the 
central government – centrally established spending limits and also cash limits were 
applied to get better control over local spending. It was achieved by linking the block 
grant financing system to government’s annual guidelines on the local government 
current and capital expenditure (Greenwood 1981; Hood and Wright 1981). It has also 
been argued that matching grants can erode the sub-national governments’ discretion 
over policy, given that the scarce resources would be more likely to be used to match 
national grants rather than pursue policies considered to be actual priorities for the 
sub-national governments (Levine and Posner 1981).  
At the same time, alongside more top-down budgetary decision-making on the 
aggregates, the cutback budgeting is likely to bring about more flexibility at the lower 
levels. Rubin (1980) points out that in order to cope with retrenchment, administrators 
need flexibility, “The level of flexibility in the budget is thus an important factor in 
the ability of administrators to manage change.” (p. 159). Even more strongly put, 
“Flexibility not only can be re-created during retrenchment, it must be re-created in 
                                                     
26
 For a more detailed discussion on different forms of centralized fiscal governance see Hallerberg et 
al. (2007, 2009). 
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order to carry out retrenchment activities.” (Rubin 1980, p. 177) Schick (1988, p. 531) 
also notes that the retrenchment process, which is accompanied by tighter controls 
and less discretion, may demoralize public servants and hence “more managerial 
flexibility can be an implicit quid pro quo for giving agencies less money.” Also, he 
argues that allowing agencies and line ministries to reallocate the reduced funds 
according to their perceived needs would be a way for easing the resistance to cuts (p. 
531). Furthermore, Schick (1988) notes that there might be political reasons for 
increasing the budgetary discretion and flexibility of the line agencies (after the top-
down ceilings have been imposed). Namely, by withdrawing from the details of 
expenditure, central authorities are less implicated in the details of cutbacks. Instead, 
spending agencies are compelled to make hard choices and to refuse interest group 
demands. Also, by distancing themselves from the details, they avoid being drawn 
into discussions as to “why agencies cannot achieve expected cuts”, thereby 
enhancing the probability that the targets for the cuts will be met. (Schick 1988, p. 
531) 
 
The empirical studies appear to confirm the necessity of (re)creating budgetary 
decision-making flexibilities at lower levels. Schick (1988) points out that in response 
to fiscal stress and the need to undertake cutbacks, a number of countries loosened 
detailed expenditure control and provided funds for broader categories in the budget 
(e.g. Sweden, Canada, Australia, UK, Ireland, Denmark). This often took the form of 
block appropriations and greater flexibility given to the agencies for making 
reallocations within the block appropriations. 
 
Besides more rule-based and top-down budgeting, a crisis may also reinvigorate calls 
for more “rational” forms of budgeting like performance-based budgeting, results-
based budgeting, program budgeting etc. Schick (1988) observed, for example, that 
“Cutback pressures have inspired efforts to import the techniques and ethos of 
business management into the public sector. The view is now widespread that, to 
obtain value for money, governments must hold spenders accountable for the costs 
they incur and results they produce.” Dunsire and Hood (1989) also conjecture that 
the fiscal crisis is likely to bring along an increase in monitoring and evaluation of 
organization’s activities, and renewed emphasis on management efficiencies to 
discover “the waste”. As Pollitt (2010, p. 18) notes, though, the implications of 
austerity for such reforms can be ambiguous. On the one hand, scarcity may make the 
implementation of such reforms more difficult as they cannot be “lubricated with new 
money”; on the other hand, a sense of urgency may render it more attractive to 
consider more fundamental changes in order to “rationalize” the budget-allocation 
process (p. 18). Schick (1988, p. 532) has argued that in the midst of the crisis, 
undertaking extensive reforms of budget process is not very likely because budgeting 
becomes more focused on the short term than on the long term. He claims that during 
the crisis, budgeting tries to go “back to the basics” and focus on expenditure control. 
Because of the “fixation on short-term gapmanship” during acute fiscal scarcity, the 
planning aspect of budgeting is likely to become less important; however, there might 
be some increase in “evaluative activities” and renewed focus on “management 
efficiencies” (Schick 1980, p. 127).  
 
Schick’s (1986) empirical study of OECD countries shows that fiscal stress brought 
about the re-orientation of planning in the budget process: the “plans” were converted 
into spending controls and the multiyear budgets are used to “control spending rather 
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than to plan programs” (p. 130; see also Wright 1981; Hood and Wright 1981). Schick 
(1988, p. 528) also notes that in response to fiscal stress in the 1980s, some 
industrialized countries did increase their use of evaluation methods to “weed out 
unproductive or low-priority programs” (see also Dunsire and Hood 1989), but in 
most countries fiscal stress did not spark “widespread interest in cost-effectiveness 
studies and similar techniques associated with planning-programming-budgeting 
(PBB) during the growth era.”27 All in all, Schick (1988, p. 532) concludes that 
adjustments have tended to be “piecemeal, ad hoc, and improvisational” and that “in 
most countries, the adjustments have not uprooted the core processes established over 
decades of budgetary development”. In other words, according to Schick (Ibid), 
despite fiscal stress, there was limited interest among policymakers “in big reforms” 
like performance budgeting, PPB, and zero-base budgeting (ZBB). Instead, during 
fiscal stress, the budget process focused on its oldest purpose of controlling 
expenditure and paid less attention to planning for the future and analyzing programs 
(Ibid). 
 
Some other studies, however, have shown that fiscal stress has brought about a shift 
towards more “rational” forms of budgeting. Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian (198, p. 
621) find, for example, in their case study of Cincinnati that in response to fiscal 
stress the city authorities improved the program budget (with added productivity 
measures), implemented a scheme to prioritize programs, undertook productivity 
studies and refined the accounting practices. Levine (1985) finds in his study of US 
police departments that in 30% of them, major changes in their budget formats and 
processes were made during the period of fiscal stress (1976-1981). Rubin (1980, p. 
169) shows, in her study of retrenching universities, that several universities made use 
of formula budgeting in response to the revenue squeeze. She also notes that while a 
number of universities tried to make use of zero-based budgeting in order to deal with 
cutbacks, “they had little success with it. They had difficulties in formulating criteria 
on which to judge units; they also had difficulty getting cooperation from the faculty 
in setting “negative priorities,” that is, priorities for the first things to be cut. In the 
city she studied, the city manager also tried to use zero-based budgeting but failed. 
 
In sum, the necessity to deal with fiscal stress and implement austerity measures 
appears to bring about a switch from bottom-up budgeting routines to top-down 
budgeting techniques, with more central decision-making on the aggregate 
expenditure levels (but less on the detailed appropriations). While the need to cut back 
expenditures has often given rise to calls for “more rational” and performance-
oriented budgeting practices, the central governments tend to focus on the control 
function of budgeting during fiscal stress (and go back to “the basics”), while the 
evidence is more mixed in the case of local governments. 
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 There are several examples which illustrate shifts in organizational functions with the aim of 
strengthening planning, analysis, control and evaluation functions with the overall goal to increase 
organizational efficiency. A prominent example of an effort to establish more systematic evaluation 
procedure was the “reconsideration procedure” adopted in the Netherlands, with the purpose to 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of different policies and propose lower-cost alternatives 
(Schick 1988, p. 528). The British government initiated a practice of “management information”, a 
system of gathering and reporting information making it possible “to discover and eliminate waste and 
non-essential functions” (Lee 1981, p. 42). Throughout the cutback era, planning systems were 
increasingly adopted by departments in Whitehall to enable more thorough policy analysis (see, e.g., 
Lee 1981). In the British health sector, the system of financial allocation and control was reorganized 
during the retrenchment with the aim of more rational resource planning (Wright 1981). 
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4.3. Human resource management 
 
Fiscal crisis is believed to have a major impact on public-personnel systems as 
cutbacks in personnel costs tend to reflect a decrease in the value of the human 
organization. Employee dissatisfaction in retrenchment is inevitable (Ingraham and 
Barrilleaux 1983, p. 401). Several authors have shown that organizational 
commitment and public-service loyalty are negatively associated with individuals’ 
being affiliated with a program that is being cut drastically or abolished (Romzek and 
Hendricks 1982; Lodge and Hood 2012, p. 87). As cutbacks produce a loss of 
confidence, greater fear and distrust (Levine 1984; Holzer 1986), people become 
insecure and uncertain about their futures. The existence of uncertainty, in turn, 
contributes toward negative attitudes among employees which affect their work, their 
relationship with management, and their commitment to continue working for the 
organization (Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980, p. 577; Levine 1984; Cayer 1986; 
Holzer 1986). A declining organization loses prestige, its employees become 
physically and emotionally stressed with interpersonal relations getting more strained 
(Levine 1984; Holzer 1986). Many authors have argued that as a result of cutbacks, 
morale declines and remains at low levels, which jeopardize investments in human 
capital (Behn 1980a, p. 617; Holzer 1986; Levine 1984).  
Struggling with retrenchment is an emotionally draining experience for all public 
officials regardless of whether they are personally affected or not (Holzer 1986; 
Brockner 1990). Personnel cutbacks are likely to create an environment of bitterness 
and a loss of trust and understanding between surviving and condemned employees or 
between colleagues competing for priority (Holzer 1986). Survivors from layoffs 
remain vital to organizational success; thus, the way how downsizing is carried out 
influences their willingness to stay with the organization (Brockner 1990).
28
 Cutback 
practices affect survivors by addressing the job insecurity that downsizing produces. 
Job insecurity generates stress, which in turn may manifest in reduced discretionary 
effort through diminished “organizational citizenship behavior” (Bies et al. 1993), 
lowered commitment (Davy et al. 1991), withdrawal from the organization and from 
the job (Brockner 1990; Davy et al. 1991), greater absenteeism, intent to leave the 
organization, higher turnover, and disability claims (Mishra and Spreitzer 1998; 
Tombaugh and White 1990; Chadwick et al. 2004). What may occur is unproductive 
but anxiety-reducing behavior like withdrawal, hostility and aggression (Levine 
1984). Several authors have warned against less concern for quality, scrap loss, and 
productivity drop of public officials resulting from poor morale and commitment 
during the crisis (see, e.g., Cayer 1986; Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980; Levine 
1984).  
Cutbacks do not only affect all people in an organization but can lead to voluntary 
quitting of the most valuable and able employees since they are the ones who most 
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 Chadwick and his co-authors (Chadwick et al. 2004) demonstrate in the study of chief executives 
and HR managers of the 114 US acute-care hospitals (conducted in 1996-97) that showing 
consideration for employees’ morale and welfare during downsizing is positively related both to the 
perceived success of downsizing and to financial performance following layoffs. Advance notice of 
layoffs is positively related to subsequent financial performance, but the provision of extended 
insurance to laid-off employees is negatively related to financial performance. Planned redesign of 
work structures is positively related to perceived success, but has neutral to negative effects on 
financial performance. 
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readily obtain outside employment offers (Behn 1980a; Greenhalgh and McKersie 
1980; Levine 1984). Ironically, these are also often the very people who are best 
qualified to carry out much needed organizational changes during the crisis (Levine 
1984). An organization’s opportunity structure can be so lean in time of cutbacks that 
it cannot reward those who demonstrate commitment. Moreover, a voluntary quitting 
of the most talented employees is likely to result in disrupted teamwork and a further 
decrease in morale and motivation among the workers left behind (Behn 1980a; 
Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980, p. 577). 
Public organizations face a dilemma in maintaining a healthy equilibrium between 
benefits and burdens in order to attract and retain high-quality employees and keep 
their loyalty towards public service. The more austerity governments face, the more 
severe is the stress on traditional public-service bargains likely to be, in terms of 
reward, competency and loyalty or responsibility (Lodge and Hood 2012, p. 87). Civil 
servants may be asked to do increasingly impossible jobs leading to overload whilst 
simultaneously facing an erosion of their privileges in terms of job security, pensions 
and secure salaries (McTighe 1979; Pollitt 2012). A retrenching organization can 
easily fall into the pattern of neglecting benefits while increasing burdens to make 
ends meet in the short term. In response, employees may attempt to cut their losses by 
disinvesting from the organization and reducing their contributions relative to the 
organization’s inducements. Such disinvestment occurs if the remaining employees 
become immobile for fear of losing seniority; if competent employees who are not in 
risk leave in anticipation of future cutbacks or in reaction to lower morale; if potential 
applicants turn elsewhere, thus shrinking the pool of available talent, if individuals are 
overqualified or undermotivated for positions they are forced to assume (Holzer 1986, 
p. 89).
29
 Remaining employees are likely to spend their time looking for other jobs as 
a protection against unemployment (Cayer 1986). If such deterioration in the 
commitment of public employees occurs, it may lead to a vicious cycle of 
organizational decline (Levine 1984).  
Cutback environment imposes new competency demands on the surviving public 
servants both to carry out cuts on existing programs (and colleagues) and to deliver 
those services that remained in a different way (Lodge and Hood 2012, p. 81). This 
would assume relevant training programs and resources in place which could facilitate 
for remaining employees to take up the slack left by leaving employees (Cayer 1986) 
and/or to develop new “austerity-age skills” related to organizing industrial bailouts 
and operating industrial policies as regulators, receivers in bankruptcy or managers 
(Lodge and Hood 2012, p. 88). Lodge and Hood (Ibid, p. 89) argue for the need of 
specific competences in the civil service to avoid the occurrence of financial crises in 
the future; for instance, there are increased demands on economic oversight 
capabilities “given the embarrassing competency deficits in regulation that were 
exposed by the 2008 financial crisis”. The difficulty is that during times of cutbacks, 
resources are not usually available for training programs (Cayer 1986). Even more, 
training is considered to be among the first items to be cut when financial stress 
develops (Ibid) as there is a tendency of cutting activities with no immediate apparent 
payoff such as staff development (Lodge and Hood 2012). 
                                                     
29
 Greiner (1986) shows the presence of such negative consequences of the downsizing in his study of 
Massachusetts’ cities and towns in the early 1980s.  
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Finally, it has been argued that cutbacks tend to highlight shortcomings in personnel 
management – problems rooted in the determination of retention rights, severance pay 
and bumping of retreat rights (Holzer 1986, p.  92). Conditions of organizational 
decline tend to foster grievances. Where there is insecurity, frustration and anxiety, 
there will be more grievances, arbitrations and worsening labor relations (Greenhalgh 
and McKersie 1980, p. 580; Levine 1984; Holzer 1986, p. 93). On the one hand, 
authors warn against the situation where top managers perceive the “retrenchment too 
important to be left to personnel managers” leading to the centralization of human 
resource decisions by delegating them to a top level committee, or to a special 
“manpower czar”, who frequently lacks personnel experience (Levine 1984). On the 
other hand, personnel managers have been claimed to be untrained or ill-prepared to 
deal with complicated cutback policies, causing technical errors (e.g. missing 
procedural deadlines) which, in turn, have resulted in lengthy appeals or costly 
judgments (Holzer 1986, p. 92; Rubin 1985, p. 206). The credibility and competence 
of the managers is often called into question when decline occurs (Cameron and 
Zammuto 1983).  
Levine (1984) proposes several structural changes in personnel regulations that could 
help organizations to cope with cutbacks. He argues that the human resource capacity 
of an agency will largely depend on the flexibility allowed by its personnel rules and 
regulations. Therefore, it is recommended to amend personnel rules and regulations in 
order to allow the use of part-time employees and volunteers alongside full-time 
professional public servants, and to encourage working on a project-basis. “A mix of 
employees who job-share, work reduced hours, are consultants, are volunteers, or are 
on loan from related organizations can provide needed technical skills the agency 
cannot afford on a full-time basis” (Levine 1984, p. 259). In addition, Levine (Ibid) 
suggests to create new position classifications to reduce costs (i.e. decreasing the 
number of higher paid positions); to hire a small core of highly professional and 
highly-paid staff, and a larger number of less-trained staff that could be employed at 
significantly lower salaries.  
 
Although there is no empirical evidence on the actual implementation of such reforms 
during the cutbacks, it could have played a role in paving the way for the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms a couple of years later. 
 
4.4. Performance management 
 
In general, very high expectations were put on performance management in 
responding to cutbacks in the 1980s. This is partly caused by the then-popular 
management concepts such as Strategic Planning, Corporate Strategy, Management 
by Objectives, PPBS, Performance-Based Budgeting, etc. Becoming more efficient 
during retrenchment was claimed to be even more challenging than in a stable 
environment, because the public officials are likely to show less concern for quality 
and productivity resulting from poor morale and commitment during the crisis (Cayer 
1986; Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980; Levine 1984). Numerous authors indicate that 
performance management assumes a very important role in cutback management 
(Cayer 1986; Holzer 1986; Ingraham and Barrilleaux 1983; Levine 1984). Moreover, 
they see the improvement of performance management as one of the main 
organizational solutions to downsizing, which is why much writing on cutbacks in the 
1980s ends with recommendations on how to develop further performance-
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management tools and processes. Two streams of literature can be identified in 
relation to the role of performance management in times of cutbacks. 
Firstly, various strategic-planning and performance-management tools have been 
proposed in order to keep employees focused on the future of an organization in a 
generally insecure environment of cutbacks.
30
 For example, Levine (1984) 
recommends the use of Management by Objectives in order to reduce drift and 
personnel tension by focusing employee activities on organizational purposes. In the 
same line of thought, performance-based budgeting has been seen as a way of keeping 
organizations both results-oriented and cost-conscious (Levine, Rubin and 
Wolohojian 1981; Schick 1988; see also section 4.2.). In addition, characteristic of the 
fashionable management ideas of the 1980s, long-term forecasting (probability 
analysis, modeling of the organization’s environment and manpower flows) to gather 
information in order to reduce uncertainty has been suggested to mitigate the cutback 
process (Levine 1984). Behn, in turn, believes that the development of a new 
“corporate strategy” for each government agency is the key to handling the crisis 
(1980). Cayer (1986) also argues that during fiscal stress, managers should analyze 
organizational activities and develop priorities. The use of Total Performance 
Management has also been recommended in order to encourage the participation of 
employees in goal-setting and to reduce the potential problems of goal displacement 
and organization drift (Levine 1984).  
Secondly, the role of performance management has been strongly emphasized in the 
implementation of cutbacks on the organizational level. It has been claimed that 
performance evaluations are to be used as an integral part of layoffs (Cayer 1986). 
The importance of performance management in carrying out cutbacks is often argued 
to safeguard the best performers. For instance, Levine (1984) proposes to strengthen 
individual performance appraisals to protect high performers during the retrenchment 
process and to develop merit pay systems as well as promotion opportunities and 
(one-time) performance bonuses to reduce fears and to indicate to personnel (and 
especially the best performers) that the organization sufficiently believes in its future 
to invest time and resources in them. Ingraham and Barrilleaux (1983, p. 401) believe 
that “rewards or incentives based on unit or office performance would allow managers 
to reward those they know to be performing well by that enhancing the manager’s 
sense of performing a worthwhile task.” The fundamental problem of cutback 
management is well addressed by Levine (1984) and Holzer (1986, p. 92), who 
demonstrate that seniority is considered more important than performance in the 
cutback policy and thus propose the amendment of personnel rules and regulations to 
increase the importance of performance criteria vis-à-vis seniority in carrying out 
reductions. 
 
Although the general attitude was overly positive towards performance management 
in the 1980s, a few authors also recognize potential problems related to it. It has been 
acknowledged that legal constraints in the public sector make performance-based 
cutback measures much harder to achieve than in private corporations (Holzer 1986, 
p. 94). Moreover, several studies demonstrate that “performance-based” layoffs can 
be manipulated by managers as ways of getting rid of unpopular employees (Dennis 
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 Schick (1988, p. 532) discusses that, on the one hand, governments in need pay less attention to 
planning the future course, guiding the economy, and analyzing programs. On the other hand, 
“planning for the future might serve as a substitute for current action, or it might be used for finding a 
way out of the current predicament” (Schick 1988, p. 124). 
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1983; Holzer 1986). Managers have been claimed to be able to develop strategies to 
ensure retention of their favorites while terminating others (Dennis 1983). Marc 
Holzer (1986) provides a thorough account of the integrity of cutback policies, which 
may be threatened by violations, for example “interpretations” and “discretionary 
decisions”, intended to help particular individuals. Holzer (Ibid) provides evidence 
based on the US Merit Systems Protection Board’s study by demonstrating that 
allegations of prohibited personnel practices in the United States in 1981 involved 
issues related to management favoritism, including the awarding of inflated 
performance-appraisal ratings based upon friendships.
31
 This led Holzer (Ibid, p. 91) 
to conclude that the capacity of the performance-appraisal process to measure 
performance for downsizing had not been adequately developed in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, none of the critics of performance-based cutbacks questions the 
performance management per se, but simply seek ways for further improvement of 
performance measurement. As cutback measures should ideally be based on 
performance information, the reliability of performance-measurement systems is 
considered very important. If performance evaluations are to be used as major criteria 
for downsizing decisions, managers need to be sure that performance-evaluation 
systems are themselves based on actual performance criteria which are relevant to 
accomplishing the goals of the organization (Cayer 1986). Performance-evaluation 
systems should take into account the inaccuracy and subjectivity of the existing 
performance appraisal process (Holzer 1986, p. 92). As an example, Holzer (Ibid) 
proposes to freeze performance ratings at some point retroactive to the onset of 
reductions-in-force planning to prevent manipulation of ratings to unjustifiably favor 
“favorites” or to use the average of several years’ performance ratings to minimize the 
possible manipulation of recent ratings. 
 
Contemporary authors addressing the use of performance management in handling the 
cutbacks are more cautious than their colleagues of the 1980s. This has likely to do 
with the decades of experience with performance management reforms, which have 
not always proved successful. Pandey (2010), for example, claims that the challenges 
for the public sector in fulfilling multiple, conflicting and vague goals are magnified 
in the process of cutback management (resulting in the drive for making things 
“easier”). Pollitt (2012) calls the need to tighten the actual implementation of 
performance management at the same time as making further expenditure savings “a 
challenge”. Moreover, he argues that “as incremental reductions of service quality 
occur, performance measurement systems may be dismantled or weakened by either 
staff/or politicians, so that unwelcome results are obscured, not recorded or not 
published” (Ibid, p. 7).  
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 Nearly one-third of the employees lacked confidence that their agencies would implement 
reductions-in-force actions in good faith. One-sixth of senior personnel officials and employees 
believed that management used cutback procedures rather than normal disciplinary procedures to 
punish poor performers (Holzer 1986, p. 91). 
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4.5. Management of changes 
 
The popular saying calls for not wasting a good crisis and using it for carrying out 
long awaited changes and even structural reforms. Successful management of change 
requires political backing, strong leadership, a supportive organizational climate 
including cross-unit cooperation, and necessary resources for designing, testing and 
implementing changes. Studies from the 1980s’ cutback era indicate difficulties with 
all these aspects of change management.  
Firstly, Schick (1988, p. 532) notes that because of the time pressure involved in 
curbing budget deficits, policy-makers’ attention has been diverted from more 
comprehensive and time-consuming reform efforts rather than preparing and 
implementing structural reforms. Cepiku and Savignon (2012) also argue that because 
of time pressures that usually accompany cutback management, the focus of the 
governments is likely to be on short-term measures rather than on structural reforms, 
although it is in fact structural reforms that could help the governments to achieve 
longer-term fiscal sustainability. Thus, there is a certain contradiction between the 
“windows of opportunity” for reform that crises can present, as argued by the 
“political economy of policy reform literature” (see, e.g., Drazen and Grilli 1993) and 
the ability and the willingness of the politicians to seize that opportunity.  
 
Secondly, new or altered needs are usually addressed by previously uncommitted 
resources. Organizations which are forced to cut their operational or program costs, 
are not likely to accumulate funds for preparing, piloting and carrying out substantial 
reforms. It is very difficult to achieve such an overwhelming change since resources 
are least available during times when cutbacks are necessary (Cayer 1986; Pollitt 
2010). Organizations in decline and with fewer resources are thus not expected to 
have the ability to stimulate organizational changes and innovative approaches (Biller 
1980; Cayer 1986). Furthermore, the cutback situation puts the remaining civil 
servants under time pressure, as they need to fulfill extra tasks related to cutbacks as 
well as to fill in the gaps left by layoffs or hiring freeze. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
civil servants find the additional time and energy needed for the preparation and 
implementation of changes. 
Thirdly, retrenchment requires high-quality and motivated leadership. The expertise 
and ability of public managers is one resource that need not decline precipitously. It is 
a resource that is critical to effective cutback management (Behn 1980a; Ingraham 
and Barrilleaux 1983, 401). During times of financial stress when difficult choices on 
uses of resources must be made, managers are forced to analyze their activities and 
develop priorities (Cayer 1986). However, the cutback manager is confronted with a 
classic dilemma: very difficult decisions must be made with fewer resources and 
unclear personal rewards (Ingraham and Barrilleaux 1983, pp. 395, 400).
32
 Perceiving 
that the penalty for wrong decisions during a crisis is very high, managers see little 
need to critically evaluate institutionalized practices and belief systems (Levine 
1984). Previous research suggests that managers revert to the safety of traditional 
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 The survey of more than 10,000 US federal managers carried out in two phases in 1979 and 1981 
proves the significance of financial rewards and incentives as motivators in a cutback environment 
(Ingraham and Barrilleaux 1983). 
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values and old behavior during periods of stress, and a conservative climate is created 
in which it is very difficult to get new ideas heard (Cayer 1986; Levine 1984). 
Therefore, public sector leaders tend to become more closed and rigid when 
threatened, which, in turn, may lead to self-protective behavior (Cameron and 
Zammuto 1983). Managers are likely to opt for a decision-making strategy that 
virtually eliminates the possibility of innovative solutions being selected. They tend to 
constrict their communication network both internally and externally during a crisis 
(for instance, by reducing the number of participants in the decision-making process, 
enforcing organizational rules and policies more closely; rejecting information that 
challenges their approaches) (Levine 1984). Consequently, leaders tend to become 
very conservative by avoiding risky alternatives that are likely to create additional 
apprehension and frustration. It has been argued that this is one reason why public 
managers favor across-the-board cuts rather than a long-term reassessment of the 
organization’s mission, because it is politically less volatile and more likely to diffuse 
the emotionally charged organizational climate (Levine 1984). 
Fourthly, the entire organizational climate during the cutbacks is not supportive of 
changes (see also section 4.3.). The organizational capability and flexibility to 
innovate, involve, and otherwise reward all critical employees is diminished during 
retrenchment as most organizational energies are directed toward cutting back 
activities and programs (Ingraham and Barrilleaux 1983, p. 395; Cameron and 
Zammuto 1983). Indeed, personnel cutbacks and innovations have even been 
considered antithetical, the former occurring in an environment which is contrary to 
reform (West 1986). Downsizing can disrupt workplace relationship networks that are 
conducive to organizational learning and improvement (Fisher and White 2000; Shah 
2000). For example, old work teams can be broken up, people have new bosses, and 
some people are demoted to positions they formerly had but for which their skills are 
rusty (Rubin 1985, p. 46). Employees (or units) who believe that they are in jeopardy 
may attempt to hinder changes by withholding information, slowing down the work 
process, publicizing the potential action, or by seeking public and political resistance 
to changes (Cayer 1986). As a result, changes will be implemented in spite of the 
workers rather than through their cooperation, and they will have a tendency to last 
only as long as pressure and surveillance are applied (Greenhalgh and McKersie 
1980, p. 580).  
Finally, managing changes and structural reforms requires cooperation and 
partnership both within and between organizations. However, cutbacks produce less 
favorable and less cooperative attitudes (Levine 1984; Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 
2011). “There will be an increased demand for the sort of public service bargains that 
are conducive to aggressive cost-cutting management that concentrates exclusively on 
‘the bottom line’ and single-mindedly sweats assets and squeezes inputs rather than 
pursuing more intangible and collegial objectives” (Lodge and Hood 2012, p. 83). 
Managers are often forced to become more competitive as cutback policies develop. 
In order to protect their turf and their employees, managers need to be aggressive in 
retaining as much as they can. Behn (1985, p. 172) reiterates the same point by 
stating: “Budgeting by subtraction inherently generates conflict. There will be losers, 
and losers have little obvious reason to cooperate”. Organizations are likely to 
experience lack of cooperation as survivalist techniques take precedence over needs 
of the organization (Cayer 1986; Lodge and Hood 2012). Similarly, units within the 
organization fearing loss of domain will focus their efforts on protecting their budget 
and their authority irrespective of the overall goals of the organization leading to goal 
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displacement (Cayer 1986; Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011). In addition, 
relationships with unions often deteriorate during retrenchments by developing a 
confrontational approach (Cayer 1986; Rubin 1985) and having a negative effect on 
potential reforms.  
Consequently, designing and carrying out substantial changes during the cutbacks can 
prove very difficult. However, the cutback environment is likely to contribute to 
“setting the scene” for the changes and reforms in the future when the immediate 
crisis with cutbacks is over, and there is more time, funds, focused attention and 
motivation of politicians, public managers and civil servants to prepare and 
implement changes. 
5. Conclusion: what can we learn for the current crisis? 
 
The literature review at hand addresses cutback management studies from the 1970s 
and 1980s with the aim to examine the main literature and related findings on cutback 
management in the public sector, and to discuss whether lessons could be learnt for 
the current crisis, where many governments in Europe are faced with the need to 
consolidate their budgets and manage the cutbacks. The paper outlined the main 
advantages and possible pitfalls related to the cutback strategies and instruments, and 
presented the main changes in management practices brought about by the need to cut 
back government expenditure.  
The review of the empirical studies on cutback management shows that although there 
are no easily discernible patterns, some rules of thumb do seem to exist. For example, 
during fiscal stress, capital spending tends to be cut first (i.e. before operating costs or 
transfers); personnel costs are cut rather reluctantly, and if it is done, hiring freeze 
seems a dominant measure utilized (rather than salary cuts or layoffs); the need to 
deal with fiscal stress and cut back expenditures brings about a shift towards 
centralization of governmental (budgetary) decision-making; human resource 
management has a crucial role in mitigating the negative impacts of crisis. As a 
general trend, cutback pressures have inspired governments to import the methods and 
ethos of business management into the public sector (see also Schick 1988, p. 531), 
paving the way for what came to be known as NPM. Governments have even 
recruited businessmen to review public sector operations with an eye toward reducing 
their cost (Schick 1988, p. 528) because one of the main goals of governments under 
pressure is achieving greater economy and efficiency (Dunsire and Hood 1989, p. 
105). Cutback management in the 1970s and 1980s clearly emphasized the rhetoric 
which was later translated into the main slogans of NPM, such as “cost-
consciousness”, strive for “efficiency”, “result-orientedness”, calls for “flexibility” in 
personnel regulations and financial management, “performance measurement” as a 
basis for decision-making.  
Still, it is worth emphasizing here that not all empirical studies confirm these patterns 
and hence one should be cautious when drawing conclusions about the use of 
different cutback instruments and shifts in management practices from the existing 
literature. Bearing this in mind, what can we learn from the previous cutback 
experience(s) during public sector retrenchment and what are the essential factors to 
take into account? 
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Before we can turn to any “lessons” from the cutback management literature, some 
important warnings and considerations need to be pointed out. Pollitt (2010, p. 21) 
notes that although comparative discussions are potentially useful, every government 
must find its own instruments to fight its way out of the crisis. Also Pandey (2010, p. 
564) insists that no definite answers exist for the cutback challenges and therefore 
cautions against relying on prescribed tools and “inventory of measures” for cutback 
management and treating the process as “piecemeal”. Thus, it is clear that no easy 
solutions exist for cutting back public expenditure, and drawing lessons (both in time 
and space) can prove to be a challenging exercise. The main constraining factors 
when learning from the previous cutback experience are briefly outlined below. 
First, several factors arising from the time perspective must be considered. As 
Dabrowski (2009) points out, the global financial crisis that started in 2008 is 
dissimilar to the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, because the dynamics of the recent 
crisis has spread from center to periphery and the scope of the current crisis is 
increasingly transnational. Pandey (2010) adds that the nature of contemporary 
cutback management differs also because we are entering an era of “cyclical 
volatility” characterized by rapid reoccurrence of cycles of decline (vs the “normal” 
cyclical fluctuations). Therefore, both the crisis itself and cutback management to deal 
with it are getting more and more complex. For example, as Pollitt (2010, p. 9) points 
out, when compared to the economic recessions in previous decades “… many 
governments … have … acquired vast new assets, in the form of major investments in 
the banks and other financial institutions”, implying the need of governments to 
acquire new capacities. Hence, besides the need to cut back, the public organizations 
are saddled with additional problems and challenges when managing the new 
responsibilities of government (see Thynne 2011; Dabrowski 2009; Gieve and 
Provost 2012). Furthermore, numerous authors (Boin et al. 2008; Pollitt 2010; 
Rosenthal 2003) draw attention to the fact that the democratic context has 
dramatically changed over the last few decades. For example, the role and influence 
of the mass media has significantly increased, and citizens have become more 
demanding, have “little patience for imperfections” (Boin et al. 2008, p. 8) and ask for 
quick and easy solutions (Pandey 2010, p. 566). Due to the transnational scope of the 
crisis and the heightened expectations of citizens towards government, “crises are 
subject to politicization”, more than ever (Rosenthal 2003, p. 133).  
Second, another set of questions stems from the dimension of space and concerns the 
comparability of crisis, cutback management and related changes in public 
administration between different countries. As the overview of the existing empirical 
research shows (see also Appendix I), most of the studies were single country cases 
addressing the US, the UK and a limited number of European countries often focusing 
on specific policy sectors and a small number of organizations, which makes it hard to 
draw generalizations. Pollitt (2010, p. 20) claims that though today all countries face 
the same storm of fiscal crisis “… we are travelling in different kinds of vessels”. This 
means that the contextual factors that define the depth of the crisis and hence shape 
the response(s) to crisis are vastly different due to country specific features. 
Confirmation for this is also provided by several provisional academic studies 
demonstrating that up to now the governments’ responses to the recent crisis have 
been diverse and even contradictory (see Bideleux 2011; Kickert 2012; Peters 2011; 
Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011; Verick and Islam 2010; Pollitt 2010, 2012). 
The importance of country-specific contextual factors in guiding the process and 
outcomes of changes in public administration practices is emphasized also by Pollitt 
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and Dan (2011), who concluded in their study on the impact of NPM reforms that the 
vast divergence in the impact of NPM reforms in different European countries can be 
attributed to the contextual factors. They explain that different institutional and 
cultural characteristics impact the pace of reforms by determining the temporal 
pattern of the reform, time and effort needed to implement the change; potential 
supportive and restrictive factors; and the scale of changes brought about.  
In sum, the issues addressed above clearly caution against emulating the previous 
cutback experiences. Therefore, public managers should “raise inconvenient 
questions” (Pandey 2010, p. 569) that would help to localize the specific cutback 
context and appropriate measures for retrenchment. Numerous authors (e.g., Pandey 
2010; Pollitt 2010) share the view that most of these questions should address a 
holistic and long-term perspective of decisions, trade-off between short-term goals 
and long-term goals, and balance between organizational present and future capacity 
(Pandey 2010). Several authors (Levine 1980; Pandey 2010; Pollitt 2010) emphasize 
that it is crucial not to limit cutback management to short-term budget cuts but to 
handle it as the management of the organizational resources for the long term (also 
including the after-crisis period), as the short-sighted approach may lead to solving 
the wrong problem or making the current problem even worse (Pandey 2010).  
When addressing the “inconvenient” issues, the main paradoxes of cutback 
management brought out by the cutback literature of the 1970s and 1980s can prove 
useful. The main tensions arising from the contradictory nature of retrenchment are 
the following:  
First, short-term savings during the crisis may lead to long-term costs. As the 
experiences of the 1970s and 1980s cutback literature show, a number of measures 
that generate quick short-term savings may bring about significant costs in the future. 
This is most clearly the case with cuts made to capital spending that may necessitate 
higher maintenance costs in the future. 
Second, cutback management calls for making rational decisions at a time when there 
are fewer resources for enhancing the rationality of decision-making. During the 
cutbacks there is an urgent need to make rational decisions, but at the same time the 
needed resources (both human resources and time) for rational decision-making may 
not be available. Hence, the paradox is that when public organizations need the 
analytical capacity the most, they may not be able to afford it (Levine 1979, p. 180). 
Third, cutbacks bring about the need to innovate in an environment unsupportive of 
innovations. Innovating in the midst of crisis is complicated due to the tendencies of 
centralization, cuts in resources and tight deadlines. Real innovations need competent 
and motivated personnel, risk-taking, decentralized organizational structures and also 
a flexible time perspective. In the period of austerity, all these conditions are unlikely 
to be present. 
Fourth, there is an urgent need for high-level expert advice when the best experts are 
overburdened and/or demotivated. Having competent public officials becomes crucial 
in the time of crisis, but one of the impacts of the crisis is that there will probably be 
fewer high-level professionals available. For example, during the retrenchment, 
organizations often fall short on critically needed (new) skills but are at the same time 
unable to hire people with these necessary skills. Further, because of attrition, 
employees with the best “employability” options elsewhere may be the first to resign, 
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which leads to losing their knowledge, skills and leadership at the time when they are 
needed the most. 
Finally, cutback management has to deal with the question of how to deliver more 
with less. The alleviation of fiscal crisis presents governments with a dilemma of how 
to handle social issues and save jobs in the conditions of constrained fiscal 
opportunities. This means that delivering more and even higher-quality public 
services with fewer resources available can become a daily puzzle for managers.  
The current cutback literature also emphasizes the increased role and new 
competences of the civil servants as measures for dealing with the crisis and 
alleviating its impacts. As a crucial factor, more transparency and clarity in public 
policy making (through reconsidering the role of professionals engaged at different 
stages of multilevel governance) is addressed. In addition, it has been acknowledged 
that the current crisis is a result of major systemic failures – a failure to put 
appropriate systems in place, a failure to regulate and monitor. Therefore, the 
contemporary literature emphasizes the necessity to revise the institutional regulatory 
systems and frameworks for managing the systemic failures that triggered the recent 
crises. 
When compared to previous eras of austerity, public managers of today have to deal 
with a much wider scope and variety of actors when managing cutbacks. Because of 
the highly complex linkages between states, markets and citizens in the contemporary 
world, the countries are less “isolated” and the role, power and authority of the 
international institutions regulating the global financial market must be considered 
more than ever before. In addition, public managers, more than ever, have to be 
leaders, as besides straightforward cutback issues they are faced with rediscovering 
and rebuilding values, integrity, legitimacy and trust in government and its 
institutions. 
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Appendix 1 
Author  Time period covered Cases covered 
Bartle (1996) 1990-1992 61 cities in the state of 
New York 
Behn (1985) Early 1980s The US Federal 
Government 
Berne and Stiefel (1993) 1970s-1980s New York City 
(educational services) 
Bideleux (2011)  
 
2008-2010 11CIS Countries and in the 
10 
Post-Communist EU 
Member 
Countries 
Bowling and Burke (2006) 1984 and 2004 State agencies in the US 
(responses from 800-900 
agency heads) 
Braun,  Johnson and Ley 
(1993) 
1979-1985 States in the US 
Dougherty and Klase (2009)  2003-2004 8 states in the US 
Downs and Rocke (1984) Pittsburgh: 1943-1976; 
San Diego: 1949-1978 
2 cities in the US: 
Pittsburgh (24 
departments) and San 
Diego (25 departments) 
Dunsire and Hood (1989) 1975-1985 The UK, Whitehall 
Fitzgerald (1979) 1970s Local governments in 
California, the US 
Glassberg (1978) 1970s New York City, the US 
Glennester (1981) 1970s The UK, Social sector  
Greenhalgh and McKersie 
(1980) 
1970s The State of New York 
Greenwood (1981) 1970s The UK, local governments 
of England and Wales 
Hartley (1981)   1957-1977 The UK, defence sector 
Hendrick (1989)  1969-1987 1 city (Lansing, Michigan), 
the US 
Hood (1981) 1970s The UK, Whitehall, non-
departmental organisations 
Kattel and Raudla (2012) 2009-2011 The Baltic States 
Kickert 2012 2008-2011 Responses of governments, 
politics and administrations 
responded to the fiscal 
crisis to the fiscal crisis in 
Britain, Germany and 
the Netherlands 
Klase (2011) Early 2000s 8 states in the US 
Kogan (1981) 1960s-1970s The UK, education sector 
Lee (1981) 1970s The UK, Whitehall  
Levine (1985) 1976-1981 Police departments in 92 
US cities (with population 
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over 50 000)  
Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian 
(1981) 
1970s 2 cities in the US: 
Cincinnati and Oakland 
Lewis (1984) 1964-1979 12 major cities in the US  
Lewis (1988) Early 1980s 154 large cities in the US 
Maher and Deller (2007)  2002-2004 119 small and medium-size 
municipalities in 
Wisconsin, the US 
Marando (1990) 1980s 153 cities in the US 
Mattila and Uusikylä (1997) 1991-1995 Finland 
Midwinter and Page (1981) 1976-80 The UK, Scotland 
NGA and NASBO (2010) 2009-2010 States in the US  
Packard et al. (2007)  9 county human services 
agencies in California, the 
US 
Pammer (1990) 1983  120 cities (large 
metropolitan cities) in the 
US 
Raudla (2012) 2008-2011 Estonia, central 
government 
Raudla and Kattel (2011) 2008-2011 Estonia, central 
government 
Rickards (1984)  1963-1975 105 German cities 
Rubin (1980) 1970s 5 universities and one city 
in the US 
Rubin (1985) Early 1980s The US, 5 federal agencies 
Schick (1983) 1970s/early 1980s US Federal Government 
Schick (1986) 1970s-1980s OECD countries 
Schick (1988) 1970s-1980s OECD countries 
Shubik, Horwitz and Ginsberg 
(2009) 
2002-2003 and 2009-
2010 
13 states in the US - 
Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, 
Chicago, Columbus (OH), 
Detroit, Kansas City (MO), 
Los Angeles, New York, 
Philadelphia, Phoenix, 
Pittsburgh and Seattle 
Stern and Sundelius (1997) 1992 Sweden, crisis 
management at the elite 
level 
Post Commission (1979) 1970s California, the US 
Ward (2001) 1990s Local governments in 
Louisiana, the US 
Weinberg (1984) 1970s/early 1980s 2 small cities (Wooster and 
Athens, Ohio) in the US 
West and Davis (1988)   
Wolman and Davis (1980) 1976-1979 23 cities, 3 counties in the 
US 
 
